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Abstract 
Although Chinese Internet sphere is under the strict censorship and control by the authority, it 
is certainly not difficult to observe the cases that Chinese individuals utilize the Internet and 
mobilize, develop influential power and exercise it against the dominant elites and deliver 
their opinion. This paper aims to analyze how the Internet promotes to crack down one of the 
strictest censorship and raise social mobilization in China by observing three different online 
social movements against the authority power and elites. And in order to discourse the power 
mobilization process and method, the theory of collective intelligence is applied.       
The results illustrate that the Internet sphere and the features of the Internet promote the 
mobilization and development of collective intelligence in significant level. By the 
individuals’ active online collective intelligence, the individuals could obtain and deliver the 
influential power more easily and effectively to the authority. The Internet sphere has higher 
capacity to democratize the information access and liberalize the action of the participation. 
By that, the Internet sphere shows high potentiality to raise the public’s position to negotiable 
level against the authority in China. 
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1 Introduction and Methodology 
1.1 Motivation 
We are living in the digital empire. Without exception, China has been rapidly producing 
digital and Internet technology with its great economic power and open trade policy. I used to 
live in China and work for an IT company. At work, I learned the huge scale and potential of 
the Internet market in China. But, what most interested me were our portal (game portal) 
website’s relationships with the users and the government. My colleagues were generating 
online news and controlling posts from users. My colleagues had a program with a search 
engine and guidelines to managing the public’s content. Sometimes we received notice from 
the government before inspections so that we could prepare and enhance our control over 
censorship. From my experience at the IT-company, I realized that Chinese Internet 
censorship is not only strict, but also highly systemized in the way that it’s administered. 
Many studies have also analyzed this topic, examining the strength of censorship in China.1  
Although there is strict control in the Chinese online sphere, there are numerous cases of 
individuals resisting state power or political corruption to highlight abuses of public power for 
private benefit.2 For instance, a petition movement concerning a Chinese student, Zhu Ling, 
is an example of the public’s resistance against the power abuses of the political elite. Qing 
Hua(清华) university student Zhu Ling was poisoned in 1994, her classmate Jasmine Sun was 
highly suspected of committing the poisoning. Due to Sun’s family’s political background, 
she was investigated but not charged in connection with the case and shortly left to the US. In 
2013, similar case occurred Shanghai and Zhu Ling’s case was once again brought up by the 
public. The public created a petition to the US White House. The petition demanded the 
deportation of Jasmine Sun to China. The petition gained over 135,000 signatures in less than 
a week, surpassing the 100,000 signature threshold needed for a US government response.3 
The story quickly reached the media’s attention. 
                                                 
1 Qinglian He, The Fog of Censorship: Media Control in China (Human Rights In China, 2008); J. Zittrain and 
B. Edelman, ‘Internet Filtering in China’, IEEE Internet Computing, 7 (2003), 70–77. 
2 Vito Tanzi, Corruption Around the World - Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures (EPub) (International 
Monetary Fund, 1998). 
3 ‘Invest and Deport Jasmine Sun Who Was the Main Suspect of a Famous Thallium Poison Murder Case 
(victim:Zhu Lin) in China | We the People: Your Voice in Our Government’ 
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Many story which similar to above case raised my curiosity. The Chinese authority practices 
online censorship in order to maintain and enhance political stability. And because the 
Chinese authority’s power is highly centralized, censorship is practiced very strictly. Being 
the case, how could Chinese individuals break down such a critical condition and raise their 
opinion to the public agenda, mobilizing a social movement against such a powerful 
authority? 
From the social protest context, it is said that the Internet offers the platform to raise citizen 
organizing.4 And by offering the higher possibility to organize social protests or mobilize 
public opinion, the Internet sphere attained a degree of institutionalization of social activism 
and recognized the importance of the institutionalization of new social forms.5 The Internet’s 
multidirectional communication and cooperative activity promotes and mobilizes the public’s 
social movement. According to Salter, the Internet enables social-movement groups and 
organizations to communicate, to generate information, and to distribute this information 
cheaply and effectively, allowing response and feedback.6 So, the Internet functions most 
importantly in the stage of raising the possibility and the capacity to organize social 
movements.  
There are lots of discussions about the Internet as an alternative media that makes it possible 
for individuals to organize social protests. However, few studies discuss details about how the 
function of the Internet makes advantageous in forming social mobilization. Therefore, this 
study will try to make contributions in analyzing the Internet’s role in the relation of the 
public and the state in China. I will do this by analyzing the influence of the Internet’s 
fundamental features and characteristics on social mobilization. In order to discourse the role 
of the Internet, it is important to analyze how, with what functions, and through what process 
individuals utilize the Internet in social mobilization. So, I selected three different online 
social movements which were mobilized to resist the actions of political corruption and 
political elites. In this thesis, I will analyze the process of mobilization and the development 
of these three movements.    
                                                                                                                                                        
<https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/petition/invest-and-deport-jasmine-sun-who-was-main-suspect-famous-
thallium-poison-murder-case-victimzhu-lin/Rd8C54p1> [accessed 12 May 2013]. 
4 Guobin Yang, The Power of the Internet in China: Citizen Activism Online (Columbia University Press, 2009). 
5 Yang. 
6 Lee Salter, ‘Democracy, New Social Movements, and the Internet’, Cyberactivism: Online activism in theory 
and practice, 2003, 117–144. 
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1.2 Research Question 
The goal of this project is to explore the role of the Internet in state-society relations in China. 
How do features of the Internet promote the process of social mobilization in China? 
In order to discuss my research question, I set the range of cases as protests that were toward 
political elites in the Internet sphere. By that, I attempted to discover how the Internet 
promotes social mobilization. During the analysis, I selected the collective intelligence theory 
by Pierre Levy to explain the mobilization and development of influential power in the 
process of social mobilization. In order to analyze the in depth process of influential power’s 
development, I particularly divided quantitative development and qualitative growth based on 
the types of the power in collective intelligence.  
In the field of research, the social and political impact of the Chinese Internet is discussed 
with different opinions. Some studies state that the Internet’s consultative mechanism can 
realize the shift of the centralized political power structure and raise liberalism in China.7 On 
the other hand, some argue that the customization capacity of Internet technology can result in 
a much higher censorship than traditional media.8 As I stated above, my intention and the 
contribution of my research is not to state that the Internet leads democracy by arguing the 
opposite opinion. However, I try to examine the Internet’s fundamental function by utilizing 
collective intelligence’s quantitative development and qualitative growth, and answering how 
the Internet can maximize the influential power of Chinese citizens.  
1.3 Methodology 
In order to find the answer to my research question, I choose a qualitative case study. 
Qualitative case study is an approach to research that facilitates exploration of a phenomenon 
within its context using a variety of data sources.9 The qualitative case study methodology is 
advantageous to explore individuals or organizations, simple through complex interventions, 
relationships, communities, or program.10 Qualitative case studies are advantageous in 
                                                 
7 Peter Dahlgren, Media and Political Engagement: Citizens, Communication, and Democracy (Cambridge 
University Press, 2009). 
8 Evgeny Morozov, The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom (PublicAffairs, 2012). 
9 Pamela Baxter and Susan Jack, ‘Qualitative Case Study Methodology: Study Design and Implementation for 
Novice Researchers’, The Qualitative Report, 13 (2008), 544–559. 
10 Baxter and Jack. 
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answering the “how” and “why” of questions.11 My research question is posed to answer how 
Internet features influence social mobilization and its’ impact on the relationship between the 
public and the authority in China. Using qualitative case analysis, I can observe the 
correlation between social mobilization and the function of the Internet in China.   
There have several options in what to focus on in the qualitative case study, it could be an 
analysis of an individual, program, process, or differences between organization…etc.12 I will 
focus on analyzing the process of public power mobilization through an Internet medium to 
answer the “how” my question. By observing the process, I will also observe the Internet’s 
special features used for the power mobilization, which will explain the “why.”  
To minimize over-generalization and to find any different strategies or performance in 
different situations, I will implement multiple case studies in the qualitative case study. In the 
multiple studies, it is important to have a clear view of both the similarities and differences, 
fundamental reasons to explain the case collection. I selected three different cases for this 
thesis. All three cases show a confrontation composition between the public and the political 
bureaucrats’ or the government’s corruption. By analyzing the public-bureaucrats’ corruption 
composition, we can find the shift of the public’s power and position. The differences 
between the cases are the individuals’ positions; the first case shows that individuals 
mobilized the power from the beginning to the end. In the second case, an individual with 
high social status (public figure) motivated the public to mobilize power. The last case is 
related to how an individual, without any public recognition, revealed a bureaucrat’s 
corruption. The functions of the Internet that were used in each case were also different; the 
first case is oriented by Human Search Flesh Engine, which is similar to a witch hunt method, 
the second case is focused on using Microblogs in order to maximize the broadcasting effect, 
the last case shows how online journalism is used to mobilize public power.    
Fig 1.1) the choice of the cases 
Case Common Differences 
Who started? Major method 
Case 1 Public vs. bureaucrats  and 
government corruption 
Individuals (group) Human Flesh Search 
Case 2 Individuals with high-
social status 
Microblog 
Case 3 Individuals without high-
social status 
Online Journalism 
 
                                                 
11 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (SAGE Publications, Incorporated, 2008), V. 
12 Baxter and Jack. 
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In order to analyze the process of power development, I will choose different types of 
observational techniques, such as discourse/text analysis, basic data analysis (which will be 
basically the number of participants) and some unsolicited document analysis.  
A good deal of the Internet content and data which I tried to find were already censored or 
manipulated by the government administration. It could be a challenge to analyzing the pure 
relationship between social movements and the function of the Internet. Many censored 
materials could be significant in illustrating the role of Internet’s function during the 
development of social mobilization. The dilemma of censorship during material collection 
was a big challenge, especially in the Microblog case analysis. Many materials which were 
collected to illustrate the power of mobilization were censored one or two years after. 
However, I also found the phenomena of bypassing censorship by individuals on the Internet, 
so I collected data which can also explain how the public bypasses censorship with Internet 
functions. In addition, in order to maintain all the information of the case development, I 
collected a great deal of news data to fill in this gap.  
Another challenge was the types of data. Instead of having direct interviews with individuals 
or actual experiments, I collected my data mostly through news content and the public’s 
online activities. This data has a weak background in explaining the individual’s motive and 
why individuals used certain functions in the process of social mobilization in China. 
However, my research focused on the relationship between social mobilization’s development 
and the role of the Internet, so it doesn’t affect my major findings.  
From the perspective of the Internet’s penetration, China still has a lower penetration rate than 
other developed countries. However, the Internet access rate in China has been rising at a 
greater rate than developed countries. Therefore, to discuss the relationship between the 
public and the authority based on the impact of the Internet should not be considered as over-
generalized.  
1.4 Outline 
Chapter 2, “Theory,” is an overview of the theories I apply for my case analysis. I choose 
“Collective Intelligence” theory to explain power mobilization in the process of social 
movements through an academic approach. In order to analyze the concept of power in the 
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process of online social mobilization, I built quantitative development and qualitative growth 
concept based on the type of power development. Furthermore, I introduce Habermasian 
public sphere to explain the Internet sphere with spatial conditions. 
Chapter 3 is “Chinese Mainstream Media and Politics.” This chapter introduces Chinese 
media history. This chapter explains the relationship between the authority, media and the 
public and discusses each other’s impact. The change in political ideology greatly affected the 
function of the media and the public’s position in China. This chapter is the background to 
understand the relationship between the authority, the Internet, and the public. 
Chapter 4 is “The Internet, the Internet in China.” This chapter is a general historical 
overview of the Internet in general and in China. In addition, there is a brief overview of 
contemporary Internet usage and the features of the Interne sphere in general and in China. 
This introduction is given in order to give a background on the Chinese Internet sphere.   
Chapters 5 through 7 are case analyses. Chapter 5 “HFS and Mass Public Investigation” 
analyzes one of the popular online phenomena in China called “Human Flesh Search (HFS).” 
I analyze how individuals mobilize and practice HFS to raise influential power against 
corrupted political bureaucrats. 
In Chapter 6, I explain the role of the Microblogging in China. The case looks at how an 
individual with high-social status utilized Microblogs to maximize a social movement. In this 
chapter, I analyze how Microblogs are advantageous in bypassing the authority’s censorship 
and broadcasting movements from the media platform perspective. 
In chapter 7, I choose the online journalism phenomena in China. This case is about a 
corrupted, former deputy mayor’s fall through online journalism. By comparing with 
mainstream journalism, I will try to analyze how and why online journalism is advantageous 
in mobilizing social movements and building the influential power to put pressure on 
corrupted bureaucrats.    
In the last chapter, I will summarize the major findings and answer the major research 
question.  
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2 Theory 
In this chapter, I will explain the academic theory with which I will frame my case analysis. I 
will present collective intelligence theory by Pierre Levy. This theory will be utilized to 
explain how power can be formulated by masses and will be used as a major theoretical 
framework in this thesis. By borrowing this theory, I will discuss how the Chinese public 
could obtain power from the perspective of process analysis.  
In the first segment of this chapter, I will briefly introduce about collective intelligence. 
Secondly, I will introduce about the theory of public sphere, and its’ connection with 
collective intelligence. Thus the second segment will be applied to analyze where a power is 
mobilized, which in this research is the Internet sphere. Followed by second segment, I will 
further explain about Internet as the sphere of collective intelligence. At the last part, I will 
discuss about the limitation of collective intelligence and different opinions of Internet’s 
social impact.   
2.1 Collective Intelligence 
Collective intelligence has similar but dissimilar definitions. It is defined by Heylighen as an 
ability of a group to solve more problems than its individual members in cybernetics.13 In the 
field of business study, Don Tapscott and Anthony D. Williams called collective as a mass 
collaboration. Combined with innovation theories and new business mechanism, 
conceptualized the ideology of the Wikinomics.  
Pierre Levy,14 a French sociologist and philosopher theorized the behavior of mass 
collaboration from anthropological, epistemological and other aspects. He conceptualized 
collective intelligence as: “A form of universally distributed intelligence, constantly 
enhanced, coordinated in real time, and resulting in the effective mobilization of skills.”15 He 
stated “resulting in the effective mobilization” as a precondition of collective intelligence, this 
                                                 
13 F. Heylighen, ‘Collective Intelligence and Its Implementation on the Web: Algorithms to Develop a Collective 
Mental Map’, Computational & Mathematical Organization Theory, 5 (1999), 253–280. 
14 Pierre Levy (1956- ): a French sociologist and philosopher. He specializes the cultural and cognitive 
implications of digital technologies and human collective intelligence. He published Cyberculture in 2001. 
15 Pierre Lévy, Collective Intelligence: Mankind’s Emerging World in Cyberspace (Perseus Books, 1999). 
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means that not all mass collaboration refer to collective intelligence. For instance, Mackey16’s 
definition of mass collectivity describes delusional result such as economic bubbles or witch-
hunts generated by spreading rumors. These outcomes are excluded in the scope of Levy’s 
collective intelligence. In other words, it could be assumed that collective intelligence is 
different in the form of simple mass collaboration based on a quality of output from collective 
behavior.  
So to speak, what Levy emphasized was that collective intelligence must not be confused with 
totalitarian projects involving the subordination of individuals to transcendent and fetishistic 
communities.17 This understanding can be considered as an additional definition of collective 
intelligence by describing the status of the individual actors. The equality of individuals is 
very important in collective intelligence. “Totalitarian project” means the involvement of 
external forces. The ideal process of mobilization is autonomous, and the purpose of 
mobilization should be recognized by the individual actors which mean that the collective 
behavior of an incognizant public, but resulting positive outcome cannot be counted as 
collective intelligence. The status of the actors is an essential criterion for Levy’s collective 
intelligence. The actors in collective intelligence can be explained in Tarde’s concept of 
public. Tarde conceptualized public and crowd-based intelligence on the status of the 
individuals in the collective. While both public and crowd are collective mobilizations, a 
public is formed by individuals gathered with a cognitive understanding of what they are 
trying to achieve and why. On the contrary, a crowd is mobilized by psychological contagion 
which stimulated by physical connection between individuals.18 Thus the actors of Levy’s 
collective intelligence are the individuals who recognize the purpose of mobilization, which is 
same as the individuals who mobilize the public.  
Carbonrally site well demonstrates the practice of above features in the collective intelligence. 
Jason Karas, a former entrepreneur launched a website www.carbonrally.com. This website 
offers individuals and groups variety missions (challenges) related to reduce CO2 emission. 
Then the site analyzes reduced emission data from users and lists up the winners of the 
missions. It could be individual vs. individual’s competition, group vs. group, and nation vs. 
                                                 
16 Charles Mackay (Mar 1812 to Dec 1889): A Scottish poet, journalist, author. Well known with his book 
<Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds>. 
17 Lévy. 
18 Gabriel Tarde, 여론과 군중(Yu Ron Gua Gun Jung: Original title in French is "L’Opinion et lafoule") 
(지도리, Ji Do Ri, 2012). 
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nation too. Interesting part in the site is the operation part. Many of the missions are actually 
suggested from the users, the ideas for the mission submitted autonomously which based on 
their enthusiasm and interests to change environmental issues. In here important point is 1) 
they are gathered autonomously with the consciousness of environmental issues, 2) they 
suggests ideas to improve environmental issues autonomously. As we see above, individuals 
in Carbonrally mobilize collectivities and produce effective results. And all of the 
mobilization process is autonomous and no one is subordinated by the others. It is because the 
individual actors interact and participate in almost every part of operation. Everybody can 
give ideas, everybody can support the ideas, and everybody can participate in the activities, 
this mechanism makes the relationship of individuals to be more equal.  
Now we understand the criteria of a subject and the condition of outcome which defines the 
scope of collective intelligence paradigm. However, if socially conscious individuals 
themselves don’t produce desirable outcome, then how is collective intelligence coordinated 
and developed the influential impact or power? All of these valid definitions of collective 
intelligence are producing influential power via behavior of communication and interactivity. 
Based on the two different paths of power development, I call the first type of path as 
“Quantitative Development,” and the second “Qualitative Growth.” It is not like 
quantitative happens first and qualitative later, and none of the paths are more important than 
another. These two different methods can be happened at the same time, or not. But both 
types of methods concentrate the impact of collective intelligence; quantitative development 
refers to the expansion of a social group, which ultimately increases the power of influence. 
As Rousseau wrote in his book Social Contract, men only unite and direct existing power to 
overcome the resistance in the state of nature, and the sum of forces can arise only where 
several person come together.19 Thus the force of an individual is much weaker than the sum 
of forces. This fundamental survival rule is also applied to more complex environment. For 
example, theoretically democracy always contains the concept that individuals hold a 
dominant power. That is because individuals formulate the sum of forces within the process 
of interaction and participation (i.e. vote).  Thus it is said that collective intelligence is not 
only uniting ideas, but it also uniting people and it constructs society.20 The process of “idea 
to be a mission” in Carbonrally site well illustrate the influential power of quantitative 
development. Two of users “Sandra Dee” and “canyongreengal” in Carbonrally posted their 
                                                 
19 Jean Jacques Rousseau and G. D. H. Cole, The Social Contract (Cosimo, Inc., 2008). 
20 Lévy. 
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idea to reduce CO2 emission “make yourself or kids waste-free lunch for 1 month.”21 Then, 
the idea got 33 positive votes, and it is chosen to publish to the public and became a mission. 
In the end, the idea could be implemented as a mission because of the supports from the 
public. The idea was more convincing with 33 additional people’s support and approval than 
2 people’s idea only. This is why this idea was promoted to be a mission among over 3000 
ideas which still remains as ideas. 
Secondly, qualitative growth raises the quality of information (对象) in collective intelligence. 
Levy described that through interactions with facts, we develop skills, understanding, and 
knowledge which are three complementary modes of cognitive transaction.22 In the context of 
this paper, “skills, understanding, and knowledge” can be read as “intelligence” which is 
transformed from information via interactive mechanism. Intelligence is constantly adding on 
to its’ influential power via further interaction by the socially conscious actors. Back to the 
example of Carbonrally site, after the idea of “make yourself or kids waste-free lunch for 1 
month” is promoted to be implicated as a mission, it was lacking the standard with idea itself. 
Everybody knows that it is beneficial to reduce CO2 emission by produce less garbage, but it 
is not suitable to be implemented as a mission. The idea itself couldn’t offer us how much we 
could reduce by exercise it, because there was no measurement and standard to compete. 
Then, Carbonrally scientific advisers analyzed that by above idea, 6ounces of packaging 
garbage from each lunch for 20 school days or work days and 44.6lbs CO2 emissions can be 
reduced.23 From this interaction between the idea provider and the scientific adviser, simple 
idea gained specific data, and this combination made idea to be more convincible to the public 
of the website. The quality (or worth) of idea is raised, and the idea obtained stronger 
influential power. The simple idea got some people’s supports which ultimately attracted 
more attention and participation, and the idea increased persuasive power and the quality by 
the interaction by different field of people.   
Qualitative growth is not only practiced in cases, but also observed on the theory itself. For 
example, the study field of research and development (R&D) conceptualized the theory of 
“Open Innovation Paradigm” 24; it means that participative and interactive mechanism 
                                                 
21 http://www.carbonrally.com/challenges/24-waste-free-lunch 
22 Lévy. 
23 http://www.carbonrally.com/challenges/24-waste-free-lunch 
24 Henry Chesbrough, Wim Vanhaverbeke and Joel West, Open Innovation:Researching a New Paradigm: 
Researching a New Paradigm (Oxford University Press, 2008). 
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between inflows and outflows could generate additional worth on the output in the part of 
worth creation or worth capture. In here additional worth could be referred as qualitative 
growth. 
Fig. 2.1) an Open Innovation Paradigm 
 
Source: http://www.iriweb.org/ (Industrial Research Institute) 
2.2 Collective Intelligence and Public Sphere 
In above, I describe collective intelligence itself. The concept of public sphere is important to 
understand about collective intelligence from spatial perspective. By understanding public 
sphere, we can understand about environmental background to mobilize collective 
intelligence. The most popular concept of public sphere is perhaps from the German 
sociologist and philosopher Jürgen Habermas. The “Habermasian public sphere” is 
“bourgeois public sphere.” He analyzed the end of 17th and 18th centuries of European public 
spheres, and conceptualized his understanding as below. 
“The bourgeois public sphere may be conceived above all as the sphere of private 
people come together as a public; they soon claimed the public sphere regulated from above 
against the public authorities themselves, to engage them in a debate over the general rules 
governing relations in the basically privatized but publicly relevant sphere of commodity 
exchange and social labor.”25 
First, the reason that he explained the scope of performers as “private people” is to exclude 
state authority; he used the word “public” to refer to the state that in the meantime had 
developed, under absolutism, into an entity having an objective existence over the person of 
the ruler.26 In this sense, public and “state authority” are synonyms. In contrast, public also 
means “everybody” or “communal” in general. Habermas characterized this second definition 
of public as “private people.” But, as stated above, the condition of public in public sphere is 
limited to a bourgeois class; the reason for using social classes for membership is to keep 
                                                 
25 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of 
Bourgeois Society (MIT Press, 1991). 
26 Habermas, P 11. 
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public sphere to be independent and autonomous from the state power. Thus, the concept of 
excluding state authority is a crucial condition in the Habermasian public sphere. As 
Habermas explains, political issues and public opinion in the 18th century were discussed and 
formed in coffee houses or debating places. Those debates and discussions could be 
developed rationally and influence public opinion in the political field. Based on the power of 
participants, actors had independent power in capitalism, economic freedom, and 
individualism.27 If we refer to the power of state authority as “central power”, then power 
from capitalistic, economic, profits can be defined as “external power.” Bourgeois classes are 
classified among different levels of social members because of those external and indirect 
powers. Therefore, they obtained the capacity to decentralize state-concentrated power. As the 
concept of the decentralization of authoritarian hegemony is directly related to the idea of 
democracy, some even described the relationship between democratic regimes and the market 
economy as a “twins” relationship.28  
As the independence of coffee house and the individuals were needed to guarantee the quality 
of public opinion, independence from the authority is essential condition for collective 
intelligence too.29 It is because independence decides the level of objectivity in collective 
intelligence. Not only that, independence is fundamental condition to mobilize the power also. 
According to Habermas, the public spheres in 17th and 18th century Europe were a means to 
keep check on governments by way of an informed and influential public opinion.30 Without 
independence from the interferences of state power, space and individuals couldn’t be counted 
as public spheres. Collective intelligence paradigm is in the same context as public sphere too. 
It is constantly coordinating its’ influential impact or power by quantitative development and 
qualitative growth. Thus, guarantee of independence is directly related to collective 
intelligence’s worth, because the worth in collective intelligence is realized by the influence 
of it. In sum, as independence in public sphere is essential background to practice the role of 
public opinion, collective intelligence also needs the independent space to mobilize its’ worth. 
Habermas stated that after a space became a qualified public sphere with guaranteed 
independence, it attempted to gather and systemize the ongoing discussions held by bourgeois 
                                                 
27 Denis McQuail, McQuail’s Mass Communication Theory, Sixth Edition (Sage Publications Ltd, 2010). 
28 Mark P. Petracca and Mong Xiong, ‘The Concept of Chinese Neo-Authoritarianism: An Exploration and 
Democratic Critique’, Asian Survey, 30 (1990), 1099–1117. 
29 Lévy; Don Tapscott, Macrowikinomics (Penguin Group (Canada), 2010); James Surowiecki, The Wisdom of 
Crowds (Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2005). 
30 McQuail. 
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private people regardless of scale, topics and style. I call this tendency “Capacity of 
Organization” of a public sphere. And by organizing process, the idea becomes 
institutionalized and thereby stated as an objective claim.31 This institutionalized objective 
idea (public opinion) either realized or at least exercised a certain level of impact. In this 
sense, we can connect the collective intelligence paradigm as one of the development 
mechanisms of public spheres. The tendency of gathering and systemizing discussion in 
public sphere can also be explained as a collective intelligence method. Thus we can consider 
as “if the proper public sphere is formed, public opinion is developed, and one of the 
development methods is through a collective intelligence mechanism.” 
The above was a concept of the ideal bourgeois public sphere which was conceptualized 
based on the phenomena from the 17th and 18th centuries in Europe. Then, how is the public 
sphere realized in contemporary society? A contemporary public sphere not only refers actual 
spaces such as coffee house or salon. Mass media is the key institution of the contemporary 
sphere, thus the quality of media decides the quality of the public sphere.32 Previous 
communication (discussion) like in coffee houses or salons is now termed as direct 
communication. After the mass media was involved, the communication mechanism changed 
to mediative communication.33 Thus to evaluate the public sphere, it is not possible to avoid 
evaluating the media; the application of quality evaluation is the same as the Habermasian 
public sphere, the level of openness (transparency) of media, and the independence from the 
state power decide capacity of organization which ultimately influence the quality of public 
sphere itself and its outcome (public opinion).  
Ironically, one of the criticisms which account the limitations in Habermasian public sphere 
theory is actually based on capitalism, which granted independency of public sphere in the 
18th century in Europe. The issue is that the media, which is located between public and 
public opinion, tends to support the existing power structure, social order, and elite hegemony 
all over the world.34 Thus the public sphere is now not only facing the challenges from the 
power of the state, but also the power of corporations (capitalism). The media itself is built on 
a commercial mechanism, Noam Chomsky examined commercial media in the United States 
                                                 
31 Habermas, p 36. 
32 McQuail. 
33 Dong-Hoon Lee, ‘A Re-conceptualization Study on the Public Sphere of Online Personal Media and Social 
Media’, Media and society, 18 (2010), 110–145. 
34 Douglas M. McLeod and James K. Hertog, ‘The Manufacture of `Public Opinion’ by Reporters: Informal 
Cues for Public Perceptions of Protest Groups’, Discourse & Society, 3 (1992), 259–275. 
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and categorized five filters from the media structure which manufacture public opinion, three 
filters are built based on media corporations’ profit purposes,35 and two are based on political 
impact.36 So media with corporative and political tendency, the public sphere and the public 
become more difficult to keep its’ independence. The public sphere assumes advertising 
functions and is further deployed as a vehicle for political and economic propaganda the more 
it becomes unpolitical as a whole and pseudo-privatized.37  
The condition of “bourgeois” in the Habermasian public sphere is often criticized too. Fraser 
criticized the Habermasian public sphere from the perspective of structural feature; she stated 
that the bourgeois conception of public sphere restricted already existing democratic 
tendencies in early capitalist societies, it created hegemonic dominant sphere, and it also 
stratified society-oriented spheres. In her terms, public sphere should function to eliminate 
social inequality and develop multiple public spheres in both stratified and egalitarian 
societies if it wants to be the measure of democracy.38 Young also agrees on the point that 
bourgeois public spheres are more like parochial enclaves with little ability to address issues 
across and between different social groups.39 Thus the scale of a public sphere’s appearance 
should not be limited, but extended. In other words, empowered people gathering public 
opinion via public sphere play the role of “watchdog” against the state power, but the 
boundary “powered people” exclude many other social levels and create deeper 
discrimination. Therefore many scholars find it’s not ideal to link the elitism concept of 
Habermasian public sphere and democracy.  
2.3 Collective Intelligence and Internet 
Levy considered that Internet is ideal space to supply ourselves with the instruments for 
sharing our mental abilities in the construction of collective intellect or imagination with 
massive data resource and participative and interactive environment. Thus he attempted to 
apply collective intelligence to point the correct direction of information technology. 
                                                 
35 Name of filters by corporational purpose: 1. Size, ownership, and profit orientation of the mass media, 2. The 
advertising license to do business, 3. Sourcing mass-media news 
36 Name of filters : 1. Flak and the enforcers, 2. Anticommunism as a control mechanism 
37 Habermas, P 175. 
38 Nancy Fraser, ‘Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy’, 
Social Text, 1990, 56–80. 
39 Tanni Haas, ‘The Public Sphere as a Sphere of Publics: Rethinking Habermas’s Theory of the Public Sphere’, 
Journal of Communication, 54 (2004), 178–184. 
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Collective intelligence is everywhere in Internet; Wikipedia, Yahoo! Ask, online news and 
online journals, and previous example Carbonrally site etc.     
Internet sphere has several advantages in different dimensions to promote collective 
intelligence. For instance, Internet sphere offers to users various channels to participate mass 
collaboration such as Blog, Micro-blog, BBS, SNS and Instant Message (IM). The speed of 
Internet increase the efficiency of the mobilization too, users are enable the simultaneous 
reception, alteration, redistribution of cultural objects which offers the environment to quickly 
mobilize collective intelligence.  
Also, because of the Internet as a new media figure, it functions as the role of mass media too. 
Whereas the mass media is built via mediative communicational mechanism, Internet is built 
via both mediative and interpersonal (or direct) communicative mechanism, which promotes 
the pattern of interactive information traffic. Such pattern of the traffic ultimately creates 
consultative and conversational environment to individuals, everybody can be a receiver and a 
sender of information in Internet. In other words, such mechanism promotes the equality of 
participants which is the essential term of collective intelligence. The equality of participants 
is important to guarantee the autonomy and indecency of collective intelligence. Internet is 
not only promoting the equality of participants, but also equality of Information. Internet is 
more advantageous to access diversified inclination on same information, which offers 
collective intelligence to be more objective. Internet certainly appears to be an important 
resource when it comes to gaining knowledge in a couple of different but interrelated ways.  
For example Peter Dahlgren, by connecting a condition of civic culture and the feature of 
search engine technology, defines influence of Internet to young citizens. He explains that 
civic cultures are modeled as an integrated circuit with 5 parameters of mutual reciprocity, 
and one of them are “knowledge and competencies.”  It means that higher accessibility of 
different information (opinion) on same fact can lead collective intelligence to be higher 
quality and worth.      
From the territorial dimension, Internet is in the advantageous position too. Because Internet 
is possible to dislocate communicative action from the post of the nation, Levy mentioned 
that Internet is more advantageous to promote collective intelligence. As he said, intelligence 
is universally distributed, delocalization is needed. Thus he accounted that cyberspace would 
become the shifting space of interaction among knowledge and knowers in de-territorialized 
intelligent communities. He knows that Internet will not shatter territorial space, identities of 
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memberships and other boundaries which fix, separate, or blanket individual human qualities, 
but it can liberates them which provides everyone with the power to forge their own images.   
Internet also has the features from the perspective of the different social level’s coexist, object 
of communication (i.e. one to one, one to public, public to one, public to public). In the 
further chapter of case analysis, I will try to analyze how Internet sphere could promote and 
offers advantageous environment to mobilize and activate collective intelligence. 
2.4 The Limitation of Collective Intelligence 
Sometimes, collective intelligence is criticized from the different dimensions. Collective 
intelligence in online is criticized from the qualitative perspective. It means that the online 
collective intelligence and collaboration actually plays weak influence on the actual social and 
political field.40 Whereas Levy’s theory, some scholars argue that Internet sphere offers the 
opportunity to build national identities to the public who is imperfect membership in a 
dispersed nation (i.e. lost territory, large temporary overseas diasporas). I consider such 
phenomena are because members who use Internet are the people with territorial, cultural 
identities. So conversely, the members under several identities territorialize the non-
territorialized medium. Levy considered that liberal environment of Internet sphere would 
influence human being, but it is passed over the possibility that the liberal but virtual 
environment could be influenced by the social characters of human beings. Therefore, as a 
result, Internet sphere promotes to build national or cultural boundaries rather than blur it.  
I found out in the course of my research that collective intelligence requires difficult 
conditions. Collective intelligence in many different scholarships requires “diversity” and 
“independence” as essential condition to mobilize it. However, because of the censorship 
mechanism based on political and corporational purpose, a diversity and independence were 
difficult to be guaranteed in a traditional media field in general,  Internet seems to be 
advantageous in its’ diversity and independence duo to massive amount of data resource and 
user oriented environment. But what if all those diversity and independence are already 
filtered or manufactured by certain power? Hand and Sandywell accounted that government 
agencies and corporate bodies the so called elite hierarchies were quick to grasp that the 
control and policing of digital information systems represent a new form of political inﬂuence 
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and power in the modern world, the control is such as information production, shaping 
political communication.  From this sense, it could be considered as Internet also has been 
maintained “controlled by elite” mechanism in certain level, which ultimately means that 
Internet can’t guarantee pure diversity and independence neither.  
It seems that collective intelligence in online sometimes does not exercise influential power 
because of limited democratic activities, or the power is mobilized but not enough to be 
influential based on shallow interaction (discussion). Although it is said that Internet is 
maintaining the censorship mechanism of mass media, but it should not ignore the fact that 
Internet is the most individual oriented medium. Internet allows individuals to participate and 
interact with other people or information regardless the outcome (harmful or beneficial for 
society and democracy). From this point, Internet sphere sometimes promote the social 
problem, but the fact that Internet offers high capacity of power mobilization to individuals is 
not deniable. Therefore, this thesis does not state the negative impact of Internet. As dynamite 
could minimize the accident of mining field, and a weapon of mass destruction, Internet 
technology could promote democracy and provoke social problems based on the purpose of 
usage and other external circumstances (censorships, commercialization). As it is mentioned 
above, this thesis focuses on examining how Internet technology is utilized, and promote 
individuals to build collectivity via collective intelligence mechanism. And ultimately build 
their influential power, which raise their social level as “negotiable” against the authoritarian 
bureaucrats.     
In sum, I have examined basic concept of collective intelligence and its’ connection with 
public sphere in this chapter. Collective intelligence is mobilized by conscious public and 
developed via interactive and participative behavior. The actors of collective intelligence 
constantly develop intelligence via collaboration. The collective intelligence develop its’ 
power with two different method; the first, I call “qualitative development.” It refers that the 
collective intelligence is constantly developing its power by recruiting more actors. The 
second method is “quantitative growth” which means the growth of information’s quality and 
persuading power. Public sphere explains the spatial condition rather than the conceptualized 
behavior. Habermas described that public spheres should be guaranteed their independence 
from state power. In the public sphere, these private people discuss political issues. Those 
process of discussion and the space where the space where the discussions take place should 
be separate from state power. The Habermasian bourgeois public sphere is often criticized 
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based on the equality of individuals to participate. But it is also often linked with democracy 
because of the concept of decentralizing authoritarian power. Internet as the most individual 
oriented medium, it has great potential to develop collective intelligence. Its diversity could 
stimulate collaborative activities and create resources which could recruit more cognized 
public by stimulating curiosity. However, it is also said that the Internet as, any other medium, 
can manipulate or manufacture resources and obstructs collective intelligence.     
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3 Chinese Mainstream Media and politics 
This chapter will present a brief overview of Modern Chinese media history and its’ 
relationship with social and political status in China. Here, I will attempt to reflect the shift of 
the media system and its’ influence on society. This chapter will be a concrete bridge to 
discuss the Internet’s influence on society as a media outlet. In addition, it will offer a 
background to isolating key features of the Internet by comparing it with characteristics of 
mainstream media. 
The historical overview of media in Chinas will begin from the 11th National party congress 
in December, 1978 – a point which is described as a turning point in political ideology and 
promotion.41 From 1978, Chinese politics and the media environment experienced diversified 
changes. From the historical overview of this period, we can understand the relationship shift 
and influence between the authority, the media, and the public.  
3.1 From 1978 to Pre-Tiananmen movement  
A wave of promoting political and economic reform in China from the late 1970s has had a 
great influence on contemporary society. To understand how and why such reforms were 
actively promoted by the Chinese Communist Party, it is important to understand the previous 
period - the Cultural Revolution. The political structure of the Proletarian Cultural Revolution 
(Cultural Revolution) tried to reach “Absolute ideological unification”. Chairman Mao 
Zedong’s ambition to unify ideology and gain self-reliance was corresponded by large and 
well organized masses. The movement to empower Mao’s proletarian ideology proceeded and 
the strong antagonism amongst the public towards capitalism rose quickly and massively. 
Harsh suppression against elite groups (such as intellectuals and bourgeois) illustrates the 
pattern of this ideology’s absolute unification. During the Cultural Revolution, media played 
an important role as a “medium of propaganda.” And it was the only function of media, every 
social field had to participate to unify ideology and the media field was no exception. Almost 
all newspapers and radio channels ceased publication and Red-guard (Party) tabloids 
flourished.42 In order to maintain an absolute, unified ideology, the media was strictly 
                                                 
41 박용수 Park Yong Soo, 중국의 언론과 사회변동(Joong-Guk Ye Un Lon Gua Sa Hue Byun Dong) [Chinese 
media and Change of society] (나남, 2000), P.98 
42 Yuezhi Zhao, Media, Market, and Democracy in China: Between the Party Line and the Bottom Line 
(University of Illinois Press, 1998), P.17. 
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controlled. All remaining media only talked about the Cultural Revolution. It rigidly followed 
the “Mass propaganda and persuasion model.”43 After Mao’s death in 1976, the Chinese 
hierarchy went through a transition period.  
The Third Plenum of the 11th Party Congress in December, 1978, is considered one of the 
major political and social turning points in Chinese Party history,44 Deng Xiaoping’s political 
ideology was officially accepted by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in this congress, and 
the position of Deng’s line became more concrete. As a result, it stabilized the system of 
power monopoly that had sprung from the transition period after Mao’s death. Open and 
reform-oriented ideology seized the upper hand on the political scene. This movement did not 
result in a decline of CCP power, the Party system continued to be centralized and run by the 
CCP in a monopoly pattern. Deng recognized the need to make up for the economic and 
political development delays caused by the Cultural Revolution. His solution was to open the 
country to the world and regain the nation’s reputation. This can be described as a shift from 
Mao’s ideological extreme radicalism to a much more flexible and loose neo-authoritarianism 
with economic reforms.45 Deng was more pluralistic from a propaganda point of view. He 
realized the revolutionary radicalization during Cultural Revolution, especially the practice of 
absolute unification, was wrong.     
 “If a party, a country, a nation approaches everything dogmatically, applies rigid 
thought, and superstitious, as a result, its vitality will stop. The party and the state will 
collapse.”46  
Above is Deng’s presentation of the relationship between the public and the Party. By 
decreasing the forcibility of the regime, this sets the public and the Party in a negotiable 
relationship from the communicational perspective. By highlighting mutuality between the 
public and the Party, Deng’s policies tried to escape from imposing ideology on society as a 
whole.47  
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47 박용수 Park Yong Soo. 
21 
 
Implication of this ideology shifted to suppressing over political dissident groups to satisfy 
the majority instead of promoting mass-propaganda such as during the Mao period.48 
According to Siebert, the press always takes on the form and coloration of the social and 
political structure within which it operates.49 So, the press system reflects the social control 
where the relation of individuals and institutions are adjusted.50 The 1978 policy shift 
significantly influenced the Chinese media sphere. The relationship shift between the Chinese 
authority and the public influenced the function of media and development. As the society 
structure became more negotiable for the public, the scale of toleration towards the media 
sphere also became wider. Different types of subject and themed newspapers were published. 
However, by the beginning of the 1980s, the Chinese media sphere was still far from Western, 
liberalistic media. The Chinese Party also developed an elaborate media network, ownership 
of party organs network was also extended by implementing planting party organs with multi-
level or pyramid-framed infrastructure.51 For instance, the SPPA (State Press and Publications 
Administration) was directly controlled and supervised by the Party propaganda department - 
thus, basically all press media was under censorship of the CCP.52 Nevertheless, compared to 
the Party’s previous history, “pluralism” and “toleration” were the keywords that described 
the character of Chinese media in the 80s. The themes of media reports were broadened to 
human interest stories, disaster news, and crime news.53 The quantity of publications also rose; 
by 1988, there were 852 newspaper titles, compared with 42 titles in 1970.54  
Hu Yaobang and his successor Zhao Ziyang are key individuals in Chinese political, and 
media history. Hu was the leader of institutes, newspapers, and professional associations, as 
well as the Party General Secretary from 1982 to 1987.55 
“Party press should be a mouthpiece of Party, but also be mouthpiece of 
public……When we look back the history of our Party, we can say that it’s very easy (position 
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as media56) if Central Party is at the correct track. However if Party is on the wrong track 
such as Cultural Revolution, then it’s turning to complicated stage, in such situation, the role 
of media as party’s mouthpiece and the role as the public’s voice are completely 
different,……then Party and the public should co-operate and overcome the difficulties.57  
Above is Hu’s definition of the role of the media. The role of the media became being the 
“public’s mouthpiece”, which means that the media gained the role of watchdog against the 
Party leaders. In the 1980s, reports of political corruption and abuse of political power – such 
as the Party Cadre’s gross abuse of power in Heilongjiang Province - began to be published 
by the central media newspaper People’s Daily.58 Resultantly, media became the interactive 
bridge between the public and the government rather than an info-sending channel to the 
public. So, Chinese media changed from “hegemonic communication” to a “petitionary 
communication” model.59      
element 
Period 
 
Party 
 
Media 
 
Public 
Mao’s period 
(Hegemonic communication model) 
Sender Bridge to public Receiver 
Post Mao (80s) 
(Petitionary communication model) 
Sender/Receiver Bridge from/to public Sender/Receiver 
Fig.3.1) Media Info-flow between the Party and public 
Following the newly liberalized environment of the media, journalists became more daring in 
publishing direct criticisms and revealing the corruption of the Party. In 1986, Shenzhen 
Youth News called on Deng Xiaoping to retire.60 And the media started to more closely serve 
in the role of the public’s mouthpiece. To maintain this role, the need for freedom of speech 
was raised.  
                                                 
56 Added by the author 
57 Hu Yaobang, ‘About party news media work(关于党的新闻工作)’, People’s daily (People’s daily, 14 .April. 
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60 Jernow. 
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After Hu Yaobang, another reformist, Zhao Ziyang, was selected for the position of Party 
General Secretary in 1987. Zhao tried to drop off the centralized power of the Party and adjust 
it to public. His reform concept was well expressed by his speech at the 13th National 
Congress in 1987. 
“Reform and open policy offered public’s spirit to new liberation, old concepts which 
chocked public for a long time now got serious damage…Finally, our economic development 
will reach to the same level as developed capitalistic countries, also we will create much 
strong democracy than those countries too…There are serious fault with the system of 
leadership organization…… This is caused by over-centralized authority…” 61 
He described the old authoritarian regime and ideology as “choking, pressure (窒息).” As a 
reformist, he considered the public to be suffering from the old regime and saw that it needed 
to be changed. What should be highlighted here is that he criticized the problems of the Party 
leadership directly. Zhao realized the serious problems of the Party’s corruption and that this 
corruption was caused by a centralized, absolute power of the authority. It is very rare that 
one of the top Party member attempts to decentralize the political power structure. This 
significantly influenced the media sphere as the media paradigm began leaning further to the 
public. “We should let the public know about important issues, let the public discuss those 
important issues. (重大情况让人民知道, 重大问题经人民讨论)”62 This famous sentence 
from the 13th National Party Congress represented the major role of the media in the late 
1980s.  From 1987 to 1988, press control was relatively relaxed. The Party allowed media 
press to publish more aggressive reports and ushered significant openness and attention to 
sensitive issues, while invigorating theoretical discussion.63 In the late 1980s, People’s Daily 
published some of the best investigative journalism. A report on the sinking of the Bohai oil 
rig resulted in the resignation of the Minister of Petroleum, and the deputy editor-in-chief 
wrote editorials which denounced Mao’s personality cult.64  
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During this period, the public gained their power by “knowing” and “discussing” the 
information delivered by the media – the media’s major role being “let the public know.” The 
Chinese media press and the public requested a more independent public sphere and freedom 
of discussion. Finally, in 1988, the Journalism Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of 
Social Science, Capital Journalism Society officially requested constitutional guarantee of 
freedom of the press.65 
Such a rapid transformation of the Chinese media paradigm in the 1980s was not simply 
because of the shift of political ideology. A national economic shift was also one of major 
triggers liberalistic waves in 80s. Development of the market economy and capitalism had a 
great influence on the press system. By promoting economic reform, market forces allowed a 
certain exercise of power to the Party,66 which offered the public an opportunity to also 
exercise their influence on the administration process. It is difficult to say whether Deng 
planned such result, but a rivalry pattern between the Party and the public & media appeared 
in the 80s. Formation of class is very undesirable phenomenon to a centralized-power 
structure. The bourgeois in the Habermasian public sphere could exercise power against the 
authority by relying on their economic and intellectual power. The rise of economic class in 
China promoted the idea of the need for a middle class of independent entrepreneurs, 
bureaucrats, and technological and cultural elites capable of securing and maintaining the 
foundation for democratic governance to become the dominant forces of society at that time.67  
Finally, the strongly centralized Chinese authoritarian power started to lose control. As a 
result, the Tiananmen Democracy Movement broke out in 1989.  
3.2 Tiananmen Democracy Movement 
Though one of the biggest, the Tiananmen Movement was not the first democracy movement 
in 1980s. In December, 1986, university students gathered together and demonstrated for 
democracy and political freedom in several major cities in China. The movement was 
suppressed before it attracted the public’s attention due to a lack of systemization and a 
slogan that was too direct against the Party in calling for a democratization of the political 
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system. The then General Secretary Hu Yaobang was removed from his position because of 
this.68 After this event, Hu became the symbol of a pre-democratic politician. Hu’s sudden 
death on April 15th, 1989, caused massive reaction from journalists, intellectuals, and students, 
with conspiracy theories regarding his death also appearing. Therefore, many scholars 
consider Hu’s death to be the direct trigger of Tiananmen movement’s outbreak.69 On April 
19th, the Shanghai based editorial “The World Economic Herald (TWEC 世界经济导报)” 
organized a memorial event for Hu. As Hu was a symbol of democracy, the event turned into 
a campaign for promoting democratization. TWEC tried to publish the campaign, but it was 
rejected by the government. This direct conflict between the media organization and the Party 
captured the attention of students and intellectuals. Furthermore, journalists realized that they 
should not ignore this matter, so several journalists gathered at the Xinhua news agency 
building and marched down from Chang’an Avenue to Tiananmen Square; the number of 
participants reaching 200 who were from 30 different media organizations - hundreds of 
journalists yelling the slogans “<People’ Daily> are for people,” “We support <TWEC>.”70     
Compared to the 1986 movement, the reason the Tiananmen movement obtained so a large 
influence was partly because the major media’s staff and journalists turned their backs on the 
Party’s, refusing to be the Party’s mouthpiece. An official petition with the signatures of 
1,031 journalists from 30 different press organizations (Beijing based only) was delivered to 
the government. They requested the reform of media law and freedom of reporting.71 It could 
be assumed that the press’s active collaboration with the public promoted the movement to 
exercise a much greater impact than it would have had with only students and intellectuals. 
In the beginning, the Party didn’t take a harsh reaction; General Secretary Zhao Ziyang even 
blamed the reason for the movement on the administration not being open enough to public.72 
Zhao’s comment raised journalist’s confidence to publish about the movement more openly. 
With this push, the participants of the movement reached more than one million by May 17th. 
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Flags with “Xiao Ping! Resign from Party! Give the real power to public!” flourished.73 
Almost all Beijing newspapers printed an open letter which stated support for the students and 
was addressed to Central Committee of CCP on May 18th; it was signed by 14 news 
organizations which included People’s Daily, China Daily, CCTV, and Xinhua. Resultantly, 
the movement developed to the public level. Not only the media turned its’ back on the Party, 
some of the People's Liberation Army also joined the movement.  
 
Fig 3.2: Some younger Chinese Army in Tiananmen democracy movement 
Resource: Dong-A Daily headline of May.19th 1989 (picture from Beijing AP press) 
On May 20th, the government announced official martial law and the whole situation changed. 
The Party hardliners immediately took over all control. Zhao Ziyang was expelled and Jiang 
Zemin took his position. With such a sudden and strong reaction from the Party, the Chinese 
media couldn’t dare to deliver the demonstration issue in the manner as before. Not only that, 
this was the recall to the people who had experienced times of extreme political repression. 
The movement was put down by military force on June 4th, 1989. This movement deeply 
alarmed the Party and established the recognition that they have to keep close eye on the 
media in the future. Thus, the Party immediately established a revised press and media law to 
nip in the bud ideas which went against the Party system. 
3.3 After the Tiananmen Movement 
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After the suppression of the Tiananmen movement by military force, the Party realized the 
side-effect of autonomic, democratic policies - an intimidation to their authoritarian regime. 
Hardliners raised their power against reformers. Deng Xiaoping was essentially retired from 
substantial operation. The period from the suppression of the movement until 1992 can be 
called the “Media Depression period.” The media went through a large scale purge, the 
number of published newspapers declined from 1628 to 1459 in 1990. The Party took back all 
press cards, and issued new press card to journalists in November, 1990. The number of press 
card was reduced from 300thousand to 13thousand.74 Freedom of speech was socially and 
politically forbidden to mention. The role of media became a “messenger of the government” 
only, and the Party tradition of positive propaganda media once again was responsible for 
providing the correct direction.75 The end of media depression is difficult to define. 
Comparing current Chinese media with what it was in the 1980s, it could be considered that 
the media depression is still continuing. However, by Deng’s southern trip in 1992, the 
situation of the Chinese media had greatly changed. Deng’s trip, which put a focus on 
economic and market development, eventually changed the motto and the guideline of 
Chinese media. Market reforms after 1992 affected the media sphere but differently; it 
changed the function of media from a “Propaganda instrument” and “public’s mouthpiece” to 
an “industry,” from being “tools” to being “serving providers,” from leading the masses to 
serving the consumers.76 The market economy campaign rapidly brought the 
commercialization boom media sphere.  
After 1992, the pattern of media ownership also began to change and diversify. Ownership 
and Structure of media sources changed from directly state-owned to three alternatives; A) 
state owned, i.e. Xinhua News, CCTV, B) indirect ownership by collective and private 
businesses, quasi-government media, i.e. Chinese Industrial and Commercial News, Southern 
Weekly, C) publicly listed companies, fringe media. But, it is partly owned by the state in 
order to be controlled by the government, i.e. 21st Century Economic News, Cai Jing. Type A 
is a direct Party Organ and functions as the Party’s mouthpiece or propaganda, type B and C 
attempt to function as the “public’s voice” a little more than A. But, all types are owned by 
the CCP at different levels, which means that all press in China is directly controlled by 
government.  
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Different content themes began to reappear in the media. But as market economy became the 
major motivation of the media, media added entertainment reporting. This brought the media 
sphere financial independence, to a certain level. According to Park and other studies,77 
media’s financial independency can grant the media sphere a certain power to act against the 
state’s censorship, which can approach the liberalization of media. However, is not that 
simple to introduce such a pattern to the political and media spheres in China. Winfield and 
Peng argue that Chinese media model needs to be identified differently. The Chinese 
Communist Party just experienced the consequence of the media liberalization. So the Party 
separated clearly the financial power’s impact from the political power. In other words, 
although the Chinese media gained certain independence through economic power, the Party 
developed advanced censorship controls by legalizing the censorship law under the name of 
“Inciting subversion” or “State secret.” Thus it is said that in the 1990s, journalist could 
criticize specific points of economic reforms, but it was strictly forbidden to diametrically 
oppose the whole idea of economic reform.78 Such standards of censorship are still 
maintained. The government puts pressure on media organizations through meetings with 
editors and news directors. By that, a direct and indirect guideline of censorship is set up. 
Those that do not confirm to these controls risk having their operations shut down or having 
certain editors and journalists removed.79 Chinese news press is controlled by “censor before 
the publication” with self-censorship created through government pressure.  
In 2009, the Chinese newspaper reader rate reached 63.9 %,80 the number of Chinese 
newspaper titles reached 1,928 and total 46.74 billion copies was sold in 2011.81 In addition, 
China’s cable TV subscribers exceeded 200million, a household penetration rate of 57%.82 
Thus, the Chinese government great invests attention to media control. To control a large 
scale media structure, the Chinese government built a systematic structure. The Party built 
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more than 14 Central government ministries to involve in control of the media.83; for example, 
General Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP) monitoring all print media, State 
Administration of Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT) monitoring broadcast media, all of 
media monitoring organizations connected to Communist Party’s Central Propaganda 
Department (CPD). CPD is the direct CCP organ and middle channel to delivering the Party’s 
guidelines to all media mediums.84 
Although China was tied with Iran for the most jailed journalists in a single country, with at 
least 34 journalists imprisoned,85 the Chinese media sphere is experiencing a big change with 
opened information and globalization. At the core of this change is the Internet. Digital waves 
have significantly changed Chinese traditional media; for instance, the Chinese government 
plans to begin slowly shutting down analog transmissions from 2015 and to discontinue them 
entirely in 2020.86 Rapid growth of digitalization and the Internet’s popularization provides 
Chinese citizens to opportunity to receive a variety of information. In the next chapter, I will 
introduce the history and function of the Internet. 
In sum, I have given a historical overview of the media and the Party state’s relationship in 
China. The shift of state policy significantly affected media and the public. Chinese media 
was mass propaganda and persuasion media model with the purpose of Mao’s absolute 
unification policy during the Cultural Revolution. During 80s’, Chinese media was more close 
to petitionary media communication model based on liberalistic and open policy. After 90s’, 
based on the experience of Tiananmen pre-democracy movement, the media although became 
to be more pluralistic than Mao’s period, but the government controls strictly the media 
content and develop the media sphere more to be market oriented. 
The media is not only interacting with the authority, it also has a deep connection with the 
public as the bridge between the authority and the public. Authority, media, and the public are 
influenced by each other. When the authority attempted to instigate democratic and liberalistic 
policies, the media tended to side with the public - ultimately influencing the Tiananmen 
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Democracy Movement. Therefore, it is important to understand the role of media and its’ 
structure in order to understand the relationship of the authority and the public.        
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4 The Internet, the Internet in China 
In this chapter, I will give a brief overview of the history of the Internet. I will first explain 
the general history and the Internet’s contemporary status. Secondly, I will introduce the 
history and current circumstance of the Internet in China. This chapter will help readers to 
understand the subject of this thesis by giving an historical overview and examining the 
contemporary status of the Internet. 
4.1 The History of the Internet 
The Internet and digital technology are everywhere. However, the Internet was originally 
developed in the United States in the late 1960s, for military usage under a project named 
“ARPANET” (Advanced Research Program Agency Network). The ARPANET Project 
focused on developing a method to deliver information in the event of a nuclear attack. This is 
the origin of online post - or E-mail - services. By 1973, the word “Internet” was introduced 
for the first time by a project called “Internetting project” which focused on building networks. 
Thus, the paradigm of the Internet started to shift from “delivery” to a transparent form of 
“networking and communicate.” From the 1980s, the Internet development institution 
changed to the National Science Foundation (NSF) in the United States.  The NSF began to 
develop the Internet for academic purposes like research communication or database networks 
(sharing). Although commercialization and privatization of the Internet were promoted 
gradually from the early 80s, there weren’t distinguishable changes, and the Internet market 
remained a nonprofit and non-commercial through the beginning of 80s.  
After warming up to commercialization, from the late 1980s to 1990s, the Internet faced a 
critical turning point. The commercialization boom had arrived; the Internet quickly adapted a 
commercialization concept of development, and expanded its’ market and technology rapidly. 
For instance, many major web sites were established in the 90s, such as search engine portal 
site Yahoo.com, online shopping and auction site Ebay.com, and online retail bookshop 
Amazon.com. Due to the exponential rate that the Internet was being commercialized at, the 
NSF turned the network over to private sector operators.87 
                                                 
87 Janet Abbate, ‘Government, Business, and the Making of the Internet’, Business History Review, 75 (2001), 
147–176. 
32 
 
Such a rapid commercialization boom can be explained by the United States’ government’s 
huge promotion of high-technology and the invention of Personal Computers in the late 1980s. 
Promoting Internet technology and online markets was one of the solutions for the US 
economic recession in the early 1990s. After stock markets crashed in 1987, GDP growth 
became slow and the unemployment rate was rising rapidly. Furthermore, the US’s high tech 
sector was being threatened by the Japanese, particularly in the area of memory chips.88 From 
the US government’s point of view, commercializing Internet technology and services could 
develop a new type of industry (high tech industry), which held great potential to be an 
accelerator for economic growth. The Reagan and Bush administrations encouraged 
commercial outsourcing of government services to give a boost to the economy and private 
businesses.89 In addition, some representatives of high technology industries began calling for 
a government co-ordinated ‘technology policy,’ which was a vague term for the use of 
government funds to provide things like tax incentives, research money, and antitrust 
waivers.90 The US government was actively involved with the campaign for the 
industrialization of the Internet. State senator and Vice-president Al Gore’s project named 
“Information Superhighway” in the 90s was one of the major campaigns from the government 
level promoting digital communication.  
The fact that should be highlighted is the connection between the Internet and the economy. 
Although the excessive expansion of the Internet technology industry provoked a burst out of 
Dot-com bubble by the early 2000s, the Internet technology industry boom certainly had a 
positive effect on the stock-market and the US economy.91 A similar pattern of using the 
Internet as a market economy booster can also be observed in China. I will explain more in 
part 3.2 of this chapter. 
The invention of the “WWW (World Wide Web)” in 1991 is another significant event in 
Internet history. The WWW was first introduced in 1991 by British computer scientist Tim 
Berners Lee.92 The WWW is also referred to as “The Web.” The WWW is a system which 
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allows users to update and receive content (texts, pictures, video etc.) via the Internet. 
Basically, anyone can upload data onto the web, and everyone can see it. Precisely, the 
Internet is a technology designed to connect people via a network (system), and the WWW is 
a technology to materialize and visualize the information to the public. Thus the conception of 
the WWW marked the starting point of the Internet as a “global linking” sphere. 
Commercialization, popularization, and globalization made the Internet a valuable business 
domain. E-commerce and advertising became major forces of motivation for the further 
development of Internet technology. In 1996, Internet advertisement revenue estimated 
$300million.93 Comparing with mass media’s advertisement revenue, the Internet market has 
been growing much faster.  
By the end of the 20th century and at the beginning of the 21st century, the WWW had divided 
into two generations; “Web 1.0” and “Web 2.0.” The Web 1.0 was contents delivery (E-mail), 
information sharing or gathering by service providers (i.e. online news from portal website 
such as Yahoo) and virtual community (bulletin board, chatting service) environments. The 
latter was oriented by “Collaboration” and “Human Network” functions. The concept of Web 
1.0 was based on information sourcing, but the concept of Web 2.0 was a participatory 
environment. Subsequently, UGC (User Generated Contents) and SNS (Social Networking 
Service) have become an integral part of the Internet with Web 2.0 boom. This made Internet 
Service Providers (ISPs) happy in that they could minimize input in creating content and 
increase marketing investment. There is no significant technology innovation between these 
two generations,94 but Web 2.0 certainly realized a shift of the communication paradigm. By 
the Web 2.0 paradigm, the Internet started to become closely involved with the media field. 
The Internet, with the Web 2.0 oriented environment, received several names, such as “New 
Media” or “Alternative media.”  
Fig 4.1) World’s 20 most influential websites in 2012 
Rank Website Rank Website 
1 google.com (Search engine, mail) 11 taobao.com (E-Commerce) 
2 facebook.com (SNS) 12 linkedin.com (SNS) 
3 youtube.com (UGC) 13 blogspot.com (SNS) 
4 yahoo.com (Portal, mail) 14 google.co.in (Search engine, mail) 
5 baidu.com (Search engine) 15 Yahoo.co.jp (Portal, mail) 
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6 Wikipedia.org (UGC) 16 sina.com.cn (Portal, SNS) 
7 live.com (Search engine, mail, IM) 17 google.de (Search engine, mail) 
8 qq.com (Portal, mail, IM) 18 yandex.ru (Search engine) 
9 amazon.com (E- commerce) 19 msn.com (Portal) 
10 twitter.com (SNS) 20 wordpress.com (Open source blogging program) 
             Source: http://www.alexa.com/topsites/global  Accessed 27th nov.2012 
Fig 4.1) “World’s top 20 sites” indicates how much the Internet environment is dominated by 
Web 2.0; among 20 sites, 8 sites95 are 100% reliant on content posted by users and 6 sites96 
are partially reliant on content generated by users (most of the portal sites include Web 2.0 
services such as blog, social network, Microblog).  
By June 2012, Internet user reached 2.4 billion worldwide with a penetration rate of 34%.97 
This stable growth pattern is estimated to be maintained with the Smartphone boom. The 
popularization of Smartphone’s promotes the easy access of the Internet in great levels. The 
PC is no longer the single device with access to the Internet. By 2011, mobile cellular 
subscriptions reached around 6 billion people with 1.3 trillion USD in annual revenue,98 
which is almost 90% of the world’s population. Mobile phones now connect four times as 
many people as landline telephones. More importantly, mobile telephones also surpass 
landlines Internet devices by more than 3.5 billion users, and by 2016, it is estimated that 
more than 80% of broadband connections will be mobile. Also the estimated scale of growth 
is estimated to be 1million mobile connections being added every day by 2016.99 For example, 
Facebook has more than 250 million people actively using Facebook through mobile devices, 
twice the activity of non-mobile users.100 It could be also assumed that the trend of mobile 
devices as ICT (Information and Communication Technology) devices could bring a 
significant level of metamorphosis in the circulation of Internet contents; Internet users can 
access the Internet anytime and anywhere with mobile devices which is called the “on-the-go” 
trend.101 Overall, the promotion and popularization of mobile devices as Internet devices 
minimizes the boundaries of space and time at much more efficient level than the PC 
generation. 
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4.2 The History of the Internet in China 
The Internet in China was introduced with E-mail service in 1987. After the WWW was 
introduced to the world in 1991, China launched their first website www.china-
window.com.cn102 in 1994. Chinese Internet basically followed same steps as the US 
development course, with high commercialization. Same as the US government, the Chinese 
central government has actively encouraged agencies in the state bureaucracy, business 
schools, and private individuals to go online.103  Informatization was one of the major policies 
in the Chinese open and reform policy (改革开放) in the 90s. Over 13 years, the Chinese 
government invested more than US $ 680 billion in Internet infrastructure.104 Additionally, 
foreign investment inflow appeared in the form of joint ventures with a Chinese state-owned 
media company. Within the government’s promotion and the raised demand from the public 
by the open society policy, the Chinese Internet has been showing incredibly rapid growth. 
Right after the Internet’s first commercialization, implemented in May 1995, the number of 
online users raised from 3000 to 40000 within 4 months, while the number of computers with 
Internet access rose from 400 to 6000.105 Chinese Internet user reached 550 million with a 
penetration rate of 41.4 % in October 2012; this is more than 22% of the population of 
Internet users worldwide with a higher penetration rate than world average of 34.3%.106  
Smartphones have seen an even bigger boom in China than the West. In 2012, Internet users 
who access the web via mobile devices reached 388 million, which is greater than the 380 
million users accessing the internet via PCs.107 The number of active smartphones in China 
now exceeds the 321 million mobile phones active in the US. The Chinese Ministry of 
Industry and Information Technology estimated that China’s Internet population will reach 
800 million users by 2015, and that Internet penetration is expected to be driven up by mobile 
Internet access as the country currently  has over 1 billion (which is more than 15% of the 
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world’s mobile users) mobile phone users.108  China broke a new global record in Smartphone 
penetration after reaching 330 million smartphones by end of 2012, a 150% increase over the 
year before. It is estimated that China will have 500million Smartphones by end of 2013. This 
dramatic growth is estimated to be maintained and Chinese mobile users will soon exceed all 
mobile users in the US and Europe combined.109  
Fig 4.2) Chinese the biggest 10 websites in January 2013  
Rank Website Site nationality Rank Website Site 
nationality 
1 Baidu.com 
(Search engine) 
PRC 6 Weibo.com 
(SNS) 
PRC 
2 qq.com 
(portal) 
PRC 7 163.net 
(Portal) 
PRC 
3 Tabao.com 
(e-commerce) 
PRC 8 Tmall.com 
(E-commerce) 
PRC  
4 Sina.com.cn 
(portal) 
PRC 9 Sohu.com 
(Portal) 
PRC 
5 Google.com.hk 
(search engine) 
USA 10 Soso.com 
(Search engine) 
PRC 
             Source: http://www.alexa.com/topsites/countries/CN  Accessed 25thJan.2013 
Fig. 4.2) shows the most popular websites in China, it also reveals several features about 
Chinese Internet. There are two e-commerce sites in the top 10, Taobao.com and Tmall.com. 
Taobao.com in particular was ranked in the top three. The strong performance of E-commerce 
sites in China is due to the Chinese government’s attempts to increase the role of domestic 
consumption as a driver for GDP.110 This is the same pattern that the US followed. On Nov. 
11th, 2012 alone, these two E-commerce sites registered total sales of US $ 3.07 billion – it is 
more than 50% the revenue of total online sales in the USA on Cyber Monday (26th Nov, the 
day after Thanksgiving weekend).111 Such patterns illustrate the potential of e-commerce 
markets and the scale of China’s domestic online consumption.  
What should be highlighted in fig 4.2) is the sites’ nationality. 9 out of 10 sites are from the 
Chinese mainland. This indicates the degree to which the Chinese Internet is nationally 
concentrated and bound. Compared with other authoritarian countries such as Russia with 5 
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global sites (American sites)112 or Saudi Arabia with 9 sites from the US base out of 10,113 the 
Chinese Internet sphere shows a highly domestic condition. This illustrates the Chinese 
authority’s strict control over the inflow of international content. The case of Google and the 
Chinese government’s conflict regarding the level of openness and censorship is a good 
example to explain the specific pattern of Internet control in China. The Chinese Internet is 
relatively exclusive with localized and national information platforms. A.B. Kipnis explains 
that China’s exclusive Internet environment is propelled by the growing rates of literacy in 
simplified Chinese characters, which allows those with access to the Internet to communicate 
easily with other Chinese-literate Internet users. The association of simplified Chinese 
characters with the PRC makes it much easier to construct a national commonality.114 Thus, 
the authority can utilize the Internet medium to build a solid national unification by creating a 
self-sufficient information sphere. In short, Chinese authority implements strict surveillance 
and censorship on ISPs in order to maintain the contents offered to the public.  
The Chinese government is legally protected to control not only ISPs, but also end-users 
(public). According to the Internet security and management law,115 it is illegal to abuse the 
Internet to disturb national security; this is for the national, social collective’s benefit. It is 
also mentioned by the law that it is illegal to incite subversion of state power and 
resistance.116 But, there is no mention of the exact definition and scope of state power or who 
exactly the law benefits. By setting vague conditions of the law, the government can enforce 
the law with greater adaptability. The Chinese authority often utilizes an Online-Propaganda 
strategy. The evidence was found that the Chinese central government sent instructions to 
Internet-propaganda administrators (网宣办值班人员117) on the provincial level that detailed 
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<http://chinadigitaltimes.net/chinese/2008/04/%E9%BB%91%E9%BE%99%E6%B1%9F%E4%BF%A1%E6%
81%AF%E6%B8%AF%EF%BC%9A%E6%8A%8A%E7%9F%9B%E5%A4%B4%E6%8C%87%E5%90%91
%E5%B0%91%E6%95%B0%E8%A5%BF%E6%96%B9%E5%AA%92%E4%BD%93/> [accessed 31 January 
2013]. 
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how to direct and lead online discussions to unify ideology during the Tibet-Free movement 
in North America and Europe before the Beijing Olympics.118  
In sum, this chapter presented about the history and the feature of the Internet. Internet is 
relevantly popularized both in worldwide and China. As Internet high-technology industry 
influenced the US economy in great level in the 90s, the Chinese government raises GDP by 
promote E-commerce domestic consumption. This indicates the Internet’s economic influence 
in the world. With the popularization of the smart phone as the Internet device and Web 2.0’s 
dominance, the individuals can interact with each other to sharing information more quickly 
and ubiquitously. But unlike other authoritarian countries, Chinese government controls the 
inflow information strictly, highly domestic condition and nationally concentrated pattern of 
Chinese Internet sphere illustrated about it well, such environment make the authoritarian 
regime to raise national commonality without the interruptions. Not only censoring external 
information to the public, Chinese government also uses “leading” method to mobilize the 
discussion or public opinion the way the government wants. So to speak, Chinese Internet 
sphere also follows global trend such as Web 2.0 services, and E-commerce. However, the 
government operates diversified censorship method in order to maintain their political 
ideology.         
                                                 
118 ‘Censorship Vault: Guiding Protests Then and Now - China Digital Times (CDT)’ 
<http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2012/09/censorship-vault-guiding-protests-then-and-now/> [accessed 2 January 
2013]. 
39 
 
5 HFS and Mass Public Investigation 
This chapter examines and analyzes how individuals develop influential power through mass 
investigation by the Internet. The case of politician Zhou Jiugeng explains how individual 
Internet users can come together to take action against corrupted bureaucrats. In this case, 
individuals came together online to investigate the background and activities of Zhou. In the 
end, the online project led to the dismissal of Zhou from his position, and later he was 
convicted of bribery.  
By observing the chronological processes of organization, mobilization and collaboration in 
events, I will analyze how the Internet platform offers individuals the opportunity to realize 
their own justice and punishment against corruption. I will try to account as to whether the 
Internet can change the relationship between public and the authority in China.  
5.1 What Is Human Flesh Search (HFS)? 
The Chinese word “人肉搜索,” literally means “human flesh search (HFS).” HFS is when 
Internet users target certain persons and investigate the information related to the target. 
During the process of investigation, users utilize search engines, media applications, social 
networks and other information technology to hunt down individual suspects.119 The first HFS 
case appeared more than a decade now. One of the most significant HFS cases attracted the 
public’s eye in 2001; an Internet user posted a beautiful woman’s photo and stated that she 
was his girlfriend. Users were suspicious and investigated him and the girl in the picture. 
Soon, they found out that the girl was a model and that the Internet user was lying.120 Within 
the last decade, HFS has become quite popular in China. According to research, 
approximately 84% Internet users know what HFS is.121 Moreover, it is increasingly possible 
to find Chinese websites which specialize in HFS, such as Maopu (猫扑)122 or Zhaoren (找人
网: in English means “Finding person net”).123  
                                                 
119 Johan Lagerkvist, After the Internet, Before Democracy: Competing Norms in Chinese Media and Society 
(Peter Lang, 2010). 
120 Dongxiao Liu, ‘Human Flesh Search Engine’ <http://www.cprsouth.org/wp-
content/uploads/drupal/Dongxiao%20Liu.pdf> [accessed 26 February 2013]. 
121 Liu. 
122 dzh.mop.com/renrou 
123 www.zhaoren.net 
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HFS sites are basically operated using a consultative mechanism such as Yahoo! Answers or 
Ask.com. Whereas users asking “can you teach me how to make ribbons?” in Yahoo! 
Answers, most of the requests or questions in HFS sites are human search requests such as 
“can you find this person and this information?” In addition to HFS specialized websites, HFS 
can be mobilized in any type of site which allows users to share information and interact with 
each other such as BBS, Blogs or Microblogs (Weibo).  
In general, the formation of HFS targets is set via user’s discussion activity; more than 50% 
of HFS targets are selected in online forum.124 In the targeting process, individuals hold 
discussions and build a common opinion that “this person should or shouldn’t be a target.” 
After a target is selected, recruitment and investigation quickly follow. In most cases, targets 
are corrupt government bureaucrats and individuals engaged in illegal or unethical 
activities.125 During the process of investigation, participants collaborate together and search 
details related to the target. The investigation can happen both online and offline, but the 
Internet (online) is the platform used to gather all of the investigated information; gaining in 
impact by the discussion between information senders and receivers. 
So, what is the purpose of HFS? Sometimes HFS’s ultimate goal is to expose the target’s 
private information as a punishment mechanism. However, sometimes HFS attempts to 
deliver opinions, change problems and realize a justice confirmed and standardized by 
collective individuals. Because of this, the outbreak of HFS is often motivated by political or 
moral events. 
 
Fig. 5.1) Quarterly ratio for the number of HFS episodes over the number of Internet users in China126 
                                                 
124 Fei-Yue Wang and others, ‘A Study of the Human Flesh Search Engine: Crowd-powered Expansion of 
Online Knowledge’, Computer, 2010, 45–53. 
125 Wang and others. 
126 Wang and others. 
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Above fig.5.1) illustrates that the frequency of HFS’s. Whereas the number of Internet users 
in China is rising in a stable pattern, the frequency of HFS episodes dramatically increased in 
the second quarter of 2008. The peak period of HFS in China was during the months 
surrounding the Beijing Olympics, an event that raised conflict and issues. It can be assumed 
that the increasing popularity of the Internet possible to affects the scale and the speed of HFS 
development, but the greatest promoter of HFS’s is external events. 
Because HFS is the investigation of personal information, it is often argued that it is illegal to 
invade personal privacy because it could ultimately produce a network that generates 
violence.127 The example of the HFS conducted towards Grace Wang is an example of this. 
Grace Wang, a Chinese student at Duke University, tried to gather together pro-Tibet and pro-
China groups in order to let them communicate about the upcoming Beijing Olympics in 
April 2008. According to Wang, she was on neither side of the argument; she was simply 
trying to mediate these two groups of protesters.128 However, because of a picture that 
surfaced of Wang standing with pro-Tibetans and a Tibetan flag (fig.5.2: left), she became a 
target with the charge of betraying her motherland. Tibet is the one of the most sensitive 
issues in China; a single picture of Wang standing with a Tibetan flag generated a great level 
of aggressive attention from the public. Through HFS’s, her private information (mobile, 
parents’ house address…etc.) were posted online. As a result, people wrote abusive words on 
the wall of her parents’ house (Fig.5.3: right) and called her and parents’ mobiles to threaten 
them.  
   
Fig. 5.2: left) Grace Wang with pro-Tibetans 
Fig. 5.3: right) Grace Wang’s parents’ apartment with painting “Kill everyone in the home” and “Kill traitors” 
                                                 
127 Liu; Guang Yang and Zechao Zhang, ‘Analysis of the Privacy Issues of Human Flesh Search Engine’, in 
Computer and Communication Technologies in Agriculture Engineering (CCTAE), 2010 International 
Conference On, 2010, I, 51–54 <http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=5543708> [accessed 27 
February 2013]; Yicheng Luo and Ting Wen, ‘Human Flesh Search and Intrusion to Privacy’, Journal of China 
University of Geosciences-Social Sciences Edition, 4 (2009) <http://en.cnki.com.cn/Article_en/CJFDTOTAL-
DDXS200904015.htm> [accessed 27 February 2013]. 
128 ‘Caught in the Middle, Called a Traitor’, Washington Post <http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2008-04-
20/opinions/36775389_1_tibetan-language-chinese-flags-china-and-tibet> [accessed 26 February 2013]. 
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Such events gave HFS’s several nicknames with negative nuance; “digital witch hunt”, 
“Internet mob” and “Chinese style Internet man hunt.”129 These names were defined from the 
perspective of the punishment. The example of Grace Wang illustrates how HFS can seriously 
violate privacy and rights based on searchers’ different motivations and purposes. However, 
HFS also attempts to change social problems and realize justice based on the public’s 
standard. This kind of motivation is often observed in the HFS’s of corrupted government 
bureaucrats or mistakes made by government institutes. In October 2007, the Forestry Bureau 
of Shanxi Province, China announced that a previously presumed to be extinct tiger had been 
found by a farmer, and published a picture of the tiger, taken by the farmer. Internet users 
were suspicious about the picture. These users, especially the users with professional 
backgrounds in photography, collaborated together to analyze and investigated the picture for 
8 month. As a result, these users, with the help of other individuals, proved that the picture 
was a fake. 
The Public who participated in the above HFS placed value in “revealing the truth” and 
correcting the inefficient bureau. As a result, the public brought justice by revealing the truth 
and the original news story was corrected. In the context of this project, HFS can also be 
referred to a “people-powered search” and a “human power search engine.”130  
Although many scholars affiliated with the field of Chinese Internet and politics have 
researched HFS, few studies have analyzed in-depth the process of HFS from the perspective 
of collective intelligence. I picked the HFS case of Zhou Jiugeng in particular because the 
majority of development stage occurred online. For instance, the suspicion of corruption, 
investigation of the corruption, the mobilization of public opinion, and the promotion and 
development of public opinion…all happened online and was initiated by the public. All of 
those processes proceeded via collective intelligence mechanism. I will attempt to discover 
the role of the Internet in collective intelligence and power mobilization process by in-depth 
analysis of the event. Based on the result of the analysis, I will also try to account if Internet 
has influenced the relationship between the public and the bureaucratic elites. 
5.2 Zhou Jiugeng and His Corruption Scandal  
                                                 
129 Wang and others; Liu. 
130 Wang and others; Liu. 
43 
 
Zhou Jiugeng (周久耕) is a former director of the Real Estate Management Bureau in 
Jiangning (江宁) District, the provincial capital of Nanjing (南京). In 1992, when he was 32, 
he became an Associate-Director of the Administration Committee of the Jiangning Economy 
and Technology Development Zone (江宁经济技术开发区管委会) and was later promoted 
to director. From director of development zone, he stepped into higher position as the director 
of the Jiangning District Civil Affairs Bureau in 2002. Until his new policy of property 
market was published in December 2008, he was not in the public eye. After the new policy 
was published, the online public disagreed with the new policy. Furthermore, they started to 
suspect Zhou as a corrupt official, as the policy attempted to protect the profit of developers 
and sellers. Internet users collaborated and found evidence of his exclusive life style 
(expensive cigarette, watches, and cars) through online investigation. On December 29th, 
2008, two weeks from the time that the first evidence was exposed online, Zhou was 
dismissed from his position for “speaking to the media without authorization about the city's 
property market.”131  
After he was dismissed, official prosecutors investigated his case. According to the report 
from the Lishui County (溧水县) Prosecutor’s office, Zhou received 25 bribes between 2003 
to 2008, the total of which over 186, 000 USD.132 As a result, he was convicted of taking 
bribes and sentenced to 11years in prison on October 10th, 2009. In the further part, I will 
divide the event into several stages by milestone. I will attempt to outline the strategy of 
collective intelligence in different stages. 
5.2.1 First publication of the policy and online public reaction 
On December 10th, 2008, Zhou published a new city’s property market policy. He stated that 
the bureau would investigate property trades made under prime cost, and make it illegal. The 
next day, several media institutions published news about the new policy. Nanjing Weekend 
(南京周末) published the interview with Zhou, and titled the article as “very optimistic (很乐
                                                 
131 By Malcolm Moore in Shanghai, ‘Chinese Internet Vigilantes Bring down Another Official’, Telegraph.co.uk, 
30 December 2008, section worldnews 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/4026624/Chinese-internet-vigilantes-bring-down-
another-official.html> [accessed 27 April 2012]. 
132 ‘Online anti-corruption: Zhou Jiugeng case before and after.’ English title is translated by the author, original 
as: ‘网络反腐：盘点周久耕案前前后后(组图)-搜狐新闻’ 
<http://news.sohu.com/20091202/n268622760.shtml> [accessed 15 March 2013]. 
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观)” which was the term used by Zhou during the interview.133 The article from Nanjing 
Weekend (南京周末) only contained the interview with Zhou, therefore the content was 
optimistic about the new policy and lacked criticism. In the central official news, for example 
Xinhua net (新华网)134 also published the news about this new policy. The content of the 
article contained four actors who were related to the policy, as listed below (fig.3).135 
PART Standpoint Number of 
Chinese characters 
Zhou Jiugeng Positive 1627 
Real estate developer and specialists in real estate world Positive and negative 577 
Real estate buyer (public) Negative 120 
Lawyer Neural but state the 
policy is legal 
415 
Fig.5.4) the proportion of each part 
 Zhou’s opinion on the new policy was the major focus of the news content. He explained 
how and why the policy was beneficial to the real estate market and public by implementing 
rules such as “trading under cost price is unfair competition according to price law.”136 No 
negativity or hesitations about the new policy are mentioned by him. Some real estate 
developers and specialists supported the policy, for example “under cost price trading disturbs 
the real estate market, it is necessary to implement the policy”137 while opponents said “low 
price trading helps businesses by circulating capital.138” Buyer (public) opinion, held the 
smallest proportion in the news, it is mentioned that “Why do developers always make huge 
profits? It doesn’t make sense.”139 Lawyers stated that the policy was legal. In other words, 
initial media cover of the policy was positive and supported that the policy was legal. 
Although public opinion is mentioned, it only occurred in 5% of news related to the policy. 
The above news was published under the section of “real estate.”   
                                                 
133 ‘Director of Jiangning District Real estate bureau, Zhou Jiugeng: Next year’s property market of Juangning is 
very optimistic.’ English title is translated by the author, original as: ‘江宁区房管局局长周久耕：明年江宁楼
市很乐观_新浪房产_新浪网’ <http://nj.house.sina.com.cn/3/2008-12-11/2449.html> [accessed 1 March 2013]. 
134 Xinhua net (www.xinhuanet.com) is online version of Xinhua news. It is the People's Republic of China's 
official news agency which belongs direct to central government. 
135 ‘南京将查处低于成本价卖房的开发商引发争议_房产频道_新华网’ 
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/house/2008-12/11/content_10487004.htm> [accessed 1 March 2013]. 
136 Translated by the author, original as: 按照价格法规定，低于成本价销售，就属于不正当竞争   
137Translated by the author, original as: 有些楼盘亏本卖房子就是扰乱市场秩序的行为，很有必要进行查处 
138Translated by the author, original as: 如果通过低价销售，开发商的资金盘活了 
139Translated by the author, original as: 凭什么开发商就能永远保持暴利呢？这是非常不合情理的行为 
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The online public reacted to the new policy differently. Xinhua net published the news at 
8:45AM, December 11th. Internet users posted news and exchanged their opinions on BBS 
forum sites almost right after the news was published. In this process, a variety of types of 
posts appeared; some directly forwarded the official news with the purpose to spread the 
news, some posted their own opinion regarding the policy to express their own thoughts. For 
example, at 9:00AM, one of the users on Tianya BBS (天涯) copied the official news content 
from Xinhua net, but titled with their own emotion: “Strange, strange, strange!!!......The 
bureaucrat says it is to be responsible for the public.”140 At the end of the post, the user wrote 
“Is this director of real estate bureau corrupted or not? Please answer.”141 The public started 
to not only question why Zhou made such a policy, but also started to focus on Zhou himself.  
As curiosity grew, people turned their focus onto Zhou rather than the policy. Online posts 
stimulated to raise another angle of curiosity form the public. The target of criticism became 
the “bureaucrat (官员)” and Zhou’s corruption.  
The online comments were mostly pessimistic towards Zhou and the new policy, with angry 
emotions because of the real estate bubbles in China.142 The comments toward Zhou had 
several different focuses. For example, A) focused on director Zhou; such as “What kind of 
mental disease does he have?”143 “Zhou, fuck you,” 144 or “The crappy officer,”145 B) focused 
on the bureaucrats and party system; such as “cureless corrupted power,”146 “the 
government and the developer are in the same group,”147 “We don’t die without buy house for 
3 years, let’s see how the government (ZF) will cheat the public,”148 “have no choice, they 
will not help the public, because they are not elected (voted) by us. The public are garbage to 
                                                 
140 ‘怪怪怪！！！南京江宁查处低价房 官员称是对老百姓负责(转载)_房产观澜_天涯论坛’ 
<http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-house-128901-1.shtml> [accessed 2 March 2013]. 
141Translated by the author, original as:这个房产局局长是不是贪官？请回答 
142 ‘Greatest Real Estate Bubble In Modern History Not Done Bursting - Forbes’, Forbes 
<http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2012/10/03/greatest-real-estate-bubble-in-modern-history-has-
yet-to-really-burst/> [accessed 22 March 2013]. 
‘Greatest Real Estate Bubble In Modern History Not Done Bursting - Forbes’, Forbes 
<http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2012/10/03/greatest-real-estate-bubble-in-modern-history-has-
yet-to-really-burst/> [accessed 22 March 2013]. 
143Tranlsated by the author, original as: 什么样的精神病 
144 Tranlsated by the author, original as: 性周的, 我操你妈 
145 Translated by the author, original as: 狗官 
146 Translated by the author, original as: 不可制约的腐败权 
147 Translated by the author, original as: 开发商和政府是同一个利益集团 
148Translated by the author, original as: 三年不买房又不会死人,看看 ZF能怎样欺骗老百姓 
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most bureaucrats,”149 and “The public doesn’t recognize their country if country doesn’t. The 
public turns over their country if the country kills the public.”150 C) focused on the analysis 
of the policy itself; such as “Developers will be bankrupt if nobody buys houses...people still 
buy houses which proves that keep the higher cost is accurate, it is market economy,”151 
“According to the law…it is legal to trade with a lower cost price...actually, sellers have a 
right to trade houses with lower costs by the law.”152 
As above, we can observe different attitudes (or angles) of comments from a single post. The 
coexistence of different perspective offers an advanced sphere to promote qualitative growth. 
In a single post, the individuals’ reactions and focuses were different. The Internet delivers a 
medium for these different perspectives to be presented to individuals at the same time in an 
equal forum. As stated by Dahlgren, the Internet offers actors the accessibility of diversified 
inclination on the same information.153 Those different viewpoints on the information interact 
and stimulate individuals to develop further curiosity. 
Another post in the economy section of BBS shows a similar pattern. The user forwarded 
mass media news content, but renamed the titles of the articles. The title that the user gave to 
an article about Zhou was “I finally understand why Chinese houses are so expensive after 
hearing what Zhou said.”154 At the end of the post, the user added his personal opinion. 
From the beginning of the online discussion in the BBS sphere, there was an apparent A 
(Public) vs. B (The bureaucrats, authority) composition with clear collective solidarity pattern. 
This collective solidary promoted the event to further action (HFS) than simple discussion. 
The collective solidarity became more solid when the evidence of Zhou’s luxurious lifestyle 
was discovered via HFS. In this case, we can clearly observe internal solidarity (recognition 
                                                 
149 Translated by the author, original as: 没办法,因为不是老百姓选举的, 当然不会帮老百姓, 对大部分政府
官员来说, 老百姓就是垃圾 
150 Translated by the author, original as: 国不知有其民,民就不知有其国,国要杀其民, 民就要反其国 
151 Translated by the author, original as: 不降价如果没有人买, 开发商还不得同样倒闭…市场经济吗 
152 Translated by the author, original as: 在依法降价处理…经营者的合法权利…其实法律规定开发商是有降
价处理房子的权利 
153 Dahlgren and Olsson. 
154 ‘恍然大悟：看了江宁区房产局局长周久耕的话，我终于知道中国高房价是怎么来_经济论坛_天涯论
坛’ <http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-develop-211215-1.shtml> [accessed 2 March 2013]. 
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of actors as members within the group=A) and external solidarity (recognition that actors as 
not belonging in the group=B).155 Such as, 
• “The Communist Party (共产党) really can train the genius, the public (老百姓) 
only can afford cheaper houses.”156 
• “Now, how many good people among those who are bureaucrats (当官的)?”157  
• “All bureaucrats (官都) like to wear good watches.”158   
• “Being a bureaucrat (做官) is so good. Nice cigarettes and watches.”159  
• “I dare that there is no good bureaucrat (没有一个好人当官的).”160  
• “Do not piss the common people (老百姓) off,”161  
• “All of the Communist xxx (共xx) officers are disgusting,”162  
• “Why do salaries never raise, but the factory managers (厂长) get 250,000 
RMB raise? ... Workers (工人) are always following the leaders (领导)…”163  
                                                 
155 David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi, The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements 
(Wiley, 2004). 
156 Translated to English by the author, original comment in Chinese is “共产党真能出人才,房价低了老百姓能
买得起房.” ‘[原创]房产局长周久耕的表戴得真好 【猫眼看人】-凯迪社区’ 
<http://club.kdnet.net/dispbbs.asp?boardid=1&id=2596310&page=3&uid=&usernames=&userids=&action> 
[accessed 21 March 2013]. 
157 Translated to English by the author, original comment in Chinese is “现在当官有几个是好人.”‘[灌水]周久
耕局长抽名烟、戴名表（图） 【猫眼看人】-凯迪社区’ 
<http://club.kdnet.net/dispbbs.asp?page=1&boardid=1&id=2595930> [accessed 4 March 2013]. 
158 Translated to English by the author, original comment in Chinese is “官都喜欢戴好表的.”‘[灌水]周久耕局
长抽名烟、戴名表（图） 【猫眼看人】-凯迪社区’ 
<http://club.kdnet.net/dispbbs.asp?boardid=1&id=2595930&page=2&uid=&usernames=&userids=&action> 
[accessed 21 March 2013]. 
159 Translated to English by the author, original comment in Chinese is “做官真好,名烟名表.”‘[灌水]周久耕局
长抽名烟、戴名表（图） 【猫眼看人】-凯迪社区’ 
<http://club.kdnet.net/dispbbs.asp?boardid=1&id=2595930&page=6&uid=&usernames=&userids=&action> 
[accessed 21 March 2013]. 
160 Translated to English by the author, original comment in Chinese is “我敢说没有一个好人   当官的.” 
<http://club.kdnet.net/dispbbs.asp?boardid=1&id=2595930&page=6&uid=&usernames=&userids=&action> 
[accessed 21 March 2013].  
161 Translated to English by the author, original comment in Chinese is “你不要惹怒老百姓.”‘[灌水]周久耕局
长抽名烟、戴名表（图） 【猫眼看人】-凯迪社区’ 
<http://club.kdnet.net/dispbbs.asp?boardid=1&id=2595930&page=11&uid=&usernames=&userids=&action=> 
[accessed 21 March 2013]. 
162 ‘[灌水]周久耕局长抽名烟、戴名表（图） 【猫眼看人】-凯迪社区’ 
<http://club.kdnet.net/dispbbs.asp?boardid=1&id=2595930&page=15&uid=&usernames=&userids=&action=> 
[accessed 21 March 2013]. 
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• “When the officials (官家) have meeting, they are covered by luxury things. One 
cigarette costs the same as 2 months income of the farmer (农工).”164 
All of the above comments illustrate the identification of solidarity. Internal solidarity is a 
common identification among individuals such as “public, common people, workers, and 
farmer workers.” In contrast, external solidarity is described as “The Communist Party, 
bureaucrats, factory managers, leaders…etc.” Based on their collective solidarity, they 
recognized external members among the online users; those who commented about their 
support for the government and Zhou were external members, thus termed the “50 Cent 
Party.”165 For instance, “Did 50 Cent Party (五毛) come?”166 “What a quick reaction, is it 
private 50 Cent party (5毛)? Or is the attention from the government?”167     
From the perspective of social movements, the above process of discussion was the 
movement’s (HFS) start point. Mass media offered a source for the public to either accept or 
reject. There is a consistent tendency in authoritarian countries of using public 
communication media as tacit support in the task of maintaining order. In the case of Zhou, 
the mass media upheld a typical authoritarian pattern by covering the policy positively. 
However, in this case, such a pattern was not observed in the Internet discussion sphere, it 
was more pluralistic. The Internet sphere offered a platform for the public to form a mass 
public opinion and further a movement. Although the government framed perspective was 
delivered to the public via mass media, the public rejected this perspective and mobilized a 
collective viewpoint through autonomous discussion. Furthermore, Internet could reflect the 
public opinion to the rest of people simultaneously.   
                                                                                                                                                        
163 ‘[灌水]周久耕局长强调：切实加强党风廉政建设（图） 【猫眼看人】-凯迪社区’ 
<http://club.kdnet.net/dispbbs.asp?id=2596911&boardid=1> [accessed 4 March 2013]. 
164 Translated to English by the author, original comment in Chinese is "官家开会时，满身名牌装。岂知一条
烟，农工两月饷" 
<http://club.kdnet.net/dispbbs.asp?boardid=1&id=2595930&page=49&uid=&usernames=&userids=&action=> 
[accessed 21 March 2013]. 
165 The commentators who hired by the Chinese government, 50 Cent Party comments positive about the 
Chinese government and party to shape positive image and public opinion on the government. Because it is said 
that the government pays them 50 Cent RMB per comments, they are called as “50 Cent Party.”  
166 ‘[灌水]周久耕局长抽名烟、戴名表（图） 【猫眼看人】-凯迪社区’ 
<http://club.kdnet.net/dispbbs.asp?boardid=1&id=2595930&page=6&uid=&usernames=&userids=&action=> 
[accessed 22 March 2013]. 
167 ‘[灌水]周久耕局长强调：切实加强党风廉政建设（图） 【猫眼看人】-凯迪社区’. 
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The posts regarding Zhou and policy were largely originally discussed under the BBS 
sections of economy and real estate. However, from late in the afternoon of the 11th, topical 
posts started to spread into several different BBS sections. Unlike official media or other 
portal news sites, the Zhou issue started to draw attention from “Focused people (猫眼看人)” 
in other BBS sites such as Kaidi (凯迪, kdnet.net).168 This illustrates the advanced 
expandability of the Internet sphere. The actors noticed that if the policy was only posted on 
the real estate section, discussion would remain focused on real estate policy and not Zhou. 
Thus the actors posted about Zhou and the policy under the category of “focused people” 
where the public discuss hot issue people. Consequently, public opinion and curiosity became 
focused on Zhou in far greater levels. In the Habermasian public sphere, after public opinion 
and focus is settled, it attempts to gathers and systemize the ongoing discussion.169 Such a 
pattern was observed in the case of Zhou. After public opinion was turned to focus on Zhou, 
users continued to post about the issue under suitable categories of BBS and attempted to 
promote curiosity. In the BBS forum, related news and discussion took place under several 
categories. Discussion began under the category of the real estate, but as the discussion started 
focused on Zhou, the contents appeared under the category of “Focused people.” This kind of 
“Post(脫)” or “multi” category tendency on the Internet offers an easier environment to build 
quantitative development and qualitative growth via Interaction between individuals with 
different focuses.    
On the same day that the HFS movement was officially set up by the post from Kaidi BBS; 
the user posted the article “Dear post heroes, let’s investigate the director of Jiangning district 
real estate bureau, Zhou Jiugeng.”170 The target of HFS was set up on the same day that 
information was released to the public. 
                                                 
168 ‘[转贴]房价直降 3000元“有罪”？南京某楼盘将被查 【猫眼看人】-凯迪社区’ 
<http://club.kdnet.net/dispbbs.asp?page=1&boardid=1&id=2591794> [accessed 2 March 2013]; ‘[转贴]南京房
产局长呼吁百姓理解 【猫眼看人】-凯迪社区’ 
<http://club.kdnet.net/dispbbs.asp?page=1&boardid=1&id=2591244> [accessed 2 March 2013]. 
169 Jürgen Habermas. 
170 Original post is deleted, the source is from: ‘房管局长的工资有多少？能抽名烟戴名手表_全国政策_大成
网_腾讯网’ <http://cd.qq.com/a/20081217/000272.htm> [accessed 2 March 2013]; ‘周久耕事件戏剧性发展的
偶然与必然 - 半岛网新闻’ 
<http://news.bandao.cn/news_html/200812/20081225/news_20081225_765693.shtml> [accessed 2 March 2013]. 
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5.2.2 HFS investigation 
After three days of official HFS was announced, user name “Huage (华阁)” in Tianya BBS 
posted the below (Fig.5.5: left) pictures at 2:00AM under category of economy. The post title 
was “Click to support if you want to punish that “prime cost” director. Look what he 
smoking.”171 
  
Fig.5.5: left) Zhou Jiugeng with exclusive cigarette Fig.5.6: right) the detailed picture of the cigarette 
The user posted the picture of Zhou with exclusive cigarettes and commented on the picture 
“What is this cigarette? It is an exclusive cigarette……It costs 1500RMB (241$) per carton! 
(fig.5.5: left: blue texts)” The post got huge attention from the public, because it was 
conspicuous consumption, the public rushed to check and criticized about this morally 
unacceptable consumption habit.  This post reached almost 50,000 clicks and 400 replies. The 
post sender and the commenters interacted with each other by exchanging opinions and 
searching for further related information. For instance, some commenters searched for more 
information about the cigarettes and corrected the price as 2000RMB (324 $) per carton. 
Some users uploaded pictures of billboards advertising the cigarettes onto the post comment, 
these pictures proving that such cigarettes do exist and that the cigarette is of a high standard 
(fig.5.7). The billboard ad wrote “Respect Nanjing, enjoy top class luxury,” this ultimately 
increased the persuasive power of the original information. 
                                                 
171 ‘赞一下那个要处罚低价房局长了，看人家抽的烟，_经济论坛_天涯论坛’ <http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-
develop-212539-1.shtml> [accessed 2 March 2013]. 
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 Fig.5.7) billboard advertisement of the cigarette  
This finding quickly spread internally and externally. Internally on the Tianya BBS site, this 
post was found in the category of Shenzhen (深圳),172 social event (社会万象),173 media 
place(传媒江湖),174 hot news (热点资讯),175 real estate law and policy (房产观澜政策法规
)176…etc. Externally, this finding of the cigarettes was spread to several different BBS sites 
such as the HSW BBS site.177 As above, the Post (脫)-category pattern was observed in 
several BBS sites. For instance, in the HSW BBS site, the post appeared under “Chat topics (
杂谈),” “Real estate.” In Kaidi BBS, this scandal was found under the categories of “focused 
people(猫眼看人),” “consumers’ observation (消费观察)”178…etc.  
The Post (脫)-category tendency appeared quicker and spread more broadly this time. This 
can be explained as the investigation and curiosity gained influential power that was stronger 
than the stage of simple discussion. Such quick development of the Post (脫)-category 
tendency was based on the high speed of communication on the Internet. The Internet enables 
                                                 
172 ‘看局长抽的烟，真是公仆本色呀，1500一条（组图）！(转载)(转载)_深圳_天涯论坛’ 
<http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-47-875383-1.shtml> [accessed 3 March 2013]. 
173 ‘看南京江宁区房产局长抽的烟，真是公仆本色，1500一条_贴图专区_天涯论坛’ 
<http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-no04-753586-1.shtml> [accessed 3 March 2013]. 
174 ‘看局长抽的烟，真是公仆本色呀，1500一条（组图）！(转载)_传媒江湖_天涯论坛’ 
<http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-no06-98574-1.shtml> [accessed 3 March 2013]. 
175 ‘请大家为南京江宁房产局周局长抽 1500元/条烟被曝光事件命名_经济论坛_天涯论坛’ 
<http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-develop-212862-1.shtml> [accessed 3 March 2013]. 
176 ‘看看，扬言要严惩低价售房的房产局周局长抽的却是 1500元一条的香烟！_房产观澜_天涯论坛’ 
<http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-house-129433-1.shtml> [accessed 3 March 2013]. 
177 Bbs.hsw.cn (Hua Shang forum华商论坛) 
178 ‘[转贴]看照片南京房产局长抽 1500元的烟 【消费观察】-凯迪社区’ 
<http://club.kdnet.net/dispbbs.asp?id=2595813&boardid=63> [accessed 4 March 2013]. 
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the simultaneous reception, alteration and redistribution of cultural objects.179 By quickly re-
distributing to diversified categories of BBS, the collective intelligence raised quantitative 
development much faster and obtained stronger influential power (public opinion).  
At 00:34 AM, December 15th, user name “chenyou007” posted an article under the category 
of “focused people” on Kaidi BBS. The title was “Director Zhou smoking luxury cigarette, 
wearing exclusive watch.”180 The post didn’t contain any information pertaining to his 
policies; it only contained information about Zhou’s cigarettes. The post contained two 
pictures of Zhou with different watches (fig.5.8: left). The user explained that the Vacheron-
Constantin watch in the picture was worth more than $16,000 USD. There was no explanation 
pertaining to the second watch. 
 
Fig.5.8: Left) Zhou with identified Vacheron-Constantin watch Fig 5.9: right) Zhou with unidentified-brand 
watch 
At 7:27AM, the user name “fang1973” commented by posting another picture of Zhou 
wearing a Rolex watch. Many users asked what brand the watch in the second picture was, 
since it was not explained by the original post creator (fig.5.9: right).  At 8:17AM, a user 
discovered the brand of the watch in the second picture. He commented on the post “It is a 
Bulova” with a clear picture of the watch. After the users discovered that Zhou owned three 
different luxury watches, they started to satirize “Three Represents and Three watches (三个
代表,三个戴表).”181 The watch scandal involved three watches. The first two watches were 
                                                 
179 Denis McQuail, McQuail’s Mass Communication Theory, Sixth Edition, p148. Originally published in 
Allocutie. Baarn: Bosch and Keuning, 1982. 
180 ‘[灌水]周久耕局长抽名烟、戴名表（图） 【猫眼看人】-凯迪社区’. 
181 Three Represents (三个代表: San ge dai biao) and (三个戴表: San ge dai biao) are homophone in Chinese. 
Three Represents is the official statement for the Chinese Communist Party, originated from Jiang Zemin. It 
focuses to develop A) social force, B) advanced culture, C) Interests of the majority. 
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updated by one user. Then, the readers participated to make the presented information more 
solid and convincible. Individuals shared their curiosity about the unidentified watch. Others 
acted on this curiosity and took direct action to identify the unknown watches. Further, other 
users searched additional pictures of Zhou to discover that he owned a third luxury (Rolex) 
watch. This is a typical exhibit of a collective intelligence qualitative growth pattern, a 
“nobody knows everything, but somebody know something”182 mechanism. In this case, the 
Internet allowed individuals to communicate with each other to raise and stimulate curiosity. 
The Internet offered search tools that gave individuals the capacity to investigate on their own.  
The Internet offered individuals the ability to autonomously share their findings and 
knowledge with the public.    
Chenyou007’s post reached almost 100,000 views and more than 750 replies. The cigarettes 
and watches brought greater attention to the public. By searching, viewing, and commenting 
on topics related to Zhou, this event eventually ranked as the third hottest issue on a Top 10 
Hot Issued List in the “Public opinion channel” of the People’s Daily Online.183 On December 
16th, at 7:46AM, mass media news organizations started to publish the Zhou scandal.184 The 
news content contained both the luxury cigarettes and watch scandals related to Zhou. The 
news reviewed the exposure of the scandal by HFS and confirmed the price of the cigarettes 
from the factory. This is the first case of collective intelligence in HFS reaching a strong 
enough impact to influence the mass media. 
The next day, December 17th, a user from a BBS forum found out that director Zhou’s 
brother, Zhou Jiuzhong was one of the real estate developers in Jiangning. Furthermore, it 
was also discovered that Zhou’s policy was applied unequally between his brother’s company 
and other developers.185 The user professionally investigated this information from the 
perspective of real estate information; the post contains a variety of external links (evidence) 
to prove his point. The same day, readers continuously commented their own findings on the 
post; one user finding evidence which shows that Zhou’s brother’s company manipulated the 
                                                 
182 Lévy. 
183 ‘[灌水]周久耕局长强调：切实加强党风廉政建设（图） 【猫眼看人】-凯迪社区’ 
<http://club.kdnet.net/dispbbs.asp?id=2596911&boardid=1> [accessed 4 March 2013], original resource is 
deleted. Original resource Public Opinion Channel of People's Daily Online is http://yuqing.people.com.cn/. 
184 ‘网友曝南京一房产局局长抽天价烟 1500/条(组图)_华商新闻’ 
<http://news.hsw.cn/system/2008/12/16/006473332.shtml> [accessed 4 March 2013]. 
185 ‘[转贴]更新资料：周久耕局长周久忠经理人肉搜索新进展 【猫眼看人】-凯迪社区’ 
<http://club.kdnet.net/dispbbs.asp?page=1&boardid=1&id=2600627> [accessed 4 March 2013]. 
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trade process. This post received almost 92,000 views and more than 800 comments. The post 
reached an extraordinary number of comments in comparison with previous findings. This 
indicates that the attention from the public had significantly grown. 
Whereas many people worked to reveal Zhou’s corruption and criticize him, there were also 
users who supported Zhou. For instance, one of the blogger wrote “Zhou clearly explained 
that the new policy is to prevent dropped off and suspended building projects…it’s a personal 
choice to choose his own cigarette, why can he not wear a luxury Swiss watch? …He is a 
normal officer…In old speak ‘Don’t judge the book by a cover.’”186 Another blogger in the 
real estate business also supported Zhou on his blog, he wrote “I don’t want talk about his 
personal life, I just want to talk about his policy and the policy does make sense…What is the 
purpose of enterprises? It is profit!!”187 This illustrates the coexistence of different opinions in 
the Internet sphere; two opposite opinions coexisting and stimulating actors (individuals). 
This could be understood as independency of the public sphere. By the stimulation and 
recognition of different opinions in the independent sphere, the quality of information and 
intelligence could obtain and retain objectivity.  
On December 18th, 3:27AM, the Sichuan provincial news site (四川新闻网) published a 
report on the scandal of Zhou and his brother. This occurred less than 24hours after the HFS 
findings.188 This shortened circulation from the Internet to mass media is further evidence of 
the increasing power of public opinion. The cigarette scandal was published two days after 
HFS findings. After the number of HFS’s was escalated, a negative public opinion of Zhou 
gained power and the information circulated to the mass media as a result.   
On December 19th, 1:11AM, the journalist from the Sichuan provincial news site published 
updated information with the title “the real estate director of cigarette scandal rides in 
                                                 
186 ‘周久耕并不山寨，也不雷人 -楚芸 -搜房博客’ 
<http://blog.soufun.com/35448602/13950424/articledetail.htm> [accessed 4 March 2013]. 
187 ‘支持周久耕的观点！！ -顾军 -搜房博客’ <http://blog.soufun.com/11604449/2698638/articledetail.htm> 
[accessed 4 March 2013].企业存在的原因是什么?那就是利润, translated to English by the author. 
188Original news source from Sichuan provincial news cannot be found, but forwarded news from the site were 
found as: ‘房产局长抽天价烟续：网友曝其弟为房产老总_新闻中心_新浪网’ 
<http://news.sina.com.cn/s/2008-12-18/032716868855.shtml> [accessed 5 March 2013]. 
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Cadillac car.”189 The journalist was an HFS actor. “I (the journalist) went to the Nanjing real 
estate office...According to the information, Zhou drives a Cadillac, I (the journalist) went to 
the parking but couldn’t see the car, but the staff at parking place advised that the director 
who drives the Cadillac hasn’t come to office for few days.”190 In addition, the news 
reconfirmed the HFS findings through their own investigation. For example, the news 
corrected the relationship between Zhou and the real estate developer who was thought to be 
his brother, the journalist investigated and corrected the developer as being a cousin (系周久
耕堂弟).  
The finding of Zhou’s expensive car was not from public to the mass media, it was mass 
media to public. It can be understood that the influential power of collective intelligence 
reached to encompass mass media and subsequently promoted the mass media to actively 
participate.  
The Cadillac scandal spread quickly to BBS, Blog and other portal site news sections. When 
the QQ portal site published the news, it reached almost 5000 comments on the news post.191 
Compared with the BBS cigarette scandal post (400 comments), the watch post (750 
comments), and the brother post (800 comments), 5000 comments in the portal site indicates 
the impact of the mass media’s active involvement.  
One of the major online features in promoting the investigation of Zhou was an anonym 
system on the Internet. It can be explained by the reaction of the mass media. The mass media 
didn’t publish actively about the online public’s reaction in the beginning. The major findings 
were the cigarettes, the watches, the social status of Zhou’s brother and the Cadillac car. 
Among four major findings, three elements were discovered by Internet users. Internet users 
published those findings online anonymously and without permission. Mass media journalists 
have a higher self-censorship than online individuals and are instructed by the government 
                                                 
189 ‘房产局长抽天价烟被调查 座驾为凯迪拉克_即时报道_财经_腾讯网’ 
<http://finance.qq.com/a/20081219/001365.htm> [accessed 5 March 2013]; ‘人肉搜索，令官员谨言慎行 - 周
蓬安 - 价值中国网’ <http://www.chinavalue.net/General/Article/2008-12-19/150404.html> [accessed 5 March 
2013]. 
190 Translated by the author, original as: 记者赴 江宁区房产局…据知情人士透露, 
周久耕座驾为一辆凯迪拉克…记者在停车场并未看到凯迪拉克…门前一位工作人员告诉记者 
“开凯迪拉克的局长已经好几天没见了. 
191 ‘房产局长抽天价烟被调查 座驾为凯迪拉克_即时报道_财经_腾讯网’. 
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and the media organization. Their investigations and publications can affect not only 
themselves, but also the entire organization. Therefore, the publication of the mass media 
organization is more passive than the online public. This is illustrated by the mass media’s 
reaction to the evidence found by online users. After the first findings were revealed online on 
December 14th, the mass media didn’t publish the findings for two days. Although the mass 
media later covered the Zhou scandal, the news media’s contents only reconfirmed the finding 
made by the online investigation. The mass media’s own investigation finding (Cadillac) was 
published after significant public opinion was mobilized. Compared to the passive reaction of 
the mass media, online users were more active in publishing their findings to the public. The 
anonymity of identity and non-belonging position offered online actors a lower self-
censorship.    
After the last evidence the Cadillac was found, Internet users reacted differently and through 
different methods, some asking about Zhou’s Cadillac on the Baidu (百度) post bar.192 In the 
BBS sites, the picture of Zhou’s Cadillac was added with original news content.193 This post 
reached almost 30,000 views and over 350 comments. It is also observed that some users 
created their own posts based on several mass media news reports. One user sited several 
official news contents with negative opinions about HFS and criticized the mass media 
contents, this post reached over 35,000 views and, 510 comments. As above, it was observed 
diversified reaction and focuses from the actors in almost every stage of the event.  
5.2.3 The Central Media’s Involvement and the Result  
On December 21st, the Chinese Central TV (CCTV) news channel broadcasted the scandal of 
Zhou by showing the newspaper reports. The Internet users not only discussed the meaning of 
the official TV broadcast, but also captured stills from the TV report and posted to the public 
as below. 
                                                 
192 Baidu post bar(百度贴吧): similar to BBS mechanism. Whereas BBS find suitable section (板块) or category, 
Baidu post bar doesn’t sort out the category of the contents. 
193 ‘[转贴]周久耕局长抽天价烟被调查 座驾为凯迪拉克 【猫眼看人】-凯迪社区’ 
<http://club.kdnet.net/dispbbs.asp?page=1&boardid=1&id=2602865> [accessed 5 March 2013]. 
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Fig.5.10) the first CCTV broadcast of Zhou scandal194 
CCTV broadcasted the newspaper report which strongly assumes Zhou is corrupted (fig 5.10). 
It shows “Director Zhou! be more silence can provoke public issues.” Top of right sub-title as 
“Director, come out and speak.” Bottom of right sub-title as “Is it common to smoke such 
cigarette?” The coverage by CCTV demonstrates the influential power of the public’s 
findings. In the beginning, the pressure on Zhou was only from the public. Then, the 
provincial newspaper (mass media) started pressing Zhou by publishing his scandal. The 
CCTV’s broadcasting meant that the attention on Zhou had reached a central level. After 
CCTV’s broadcast, relevant government institutions took action. On December 29th, 15 days 
after the first cigarette scandal was exposed by HFS, Zhou was dismissed from office and his 
policy was unimplemented from January 1st, 2009.195 On October 10th, 2009, Zhou was 
sentenced to 11 years of imprisonment for taking bribes amounting to over 160,000 USD.  
5.3 Findings 
The case of Zhou was not a simple investigation. It was a Mass public investigation. This case 
illustrates how the Internet offers individuals an advantageous platform to mobilize power by 
offering the platform to solve their curiosity.  
The Internet offered actors an equal right to participate in the investigation which raised 
objectivity of the information. The Internet’s “less limited accessibility” guarantees the 
                                                 
194 Screenshot resource from:‘在赵晓之后，周久耕也成为央视的“嘉宾”！-楼市话题(业内论坛)业主论坛-北
京搜房网’ <http://bbs.soufun.com/salon~-1~7671/80572560_80572560.htm> [accessed 5 March 2013]. 
195 ‘南京开闸商品房定价权 周久耕事件引政策摇摆-搜狐财经’ 
<http://business.sohu.com/20090108/n261635889.shtml> [accessed 5 March 2013]. 
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equality of the actors which affects the quality of collective intelligence in significant level. 
Search engines also play an important role in collective intelligence; the Internet is an 
advanced environment to develop the quality of information through huge databases, accessed 
via search engines. Media richness was easily accessed with search engines, which stimulates 
individuals and develops curiosity and cognition.  
Public awareness is achieved by accessing information that is relevant to the cause. However, 
it is often difficult to get the public involved in political movements. Since traditional 
information channels may well be controlled by those whose interests are counter to that of 
the activists, the Internet may serve as alternative news and information source.196 Although it 
is said that the Internet sphere exists censorship through the blocking of access to data and 
information,197 but it is also found that the Internet sphere offers individuals a greater 
opportunity to investigate and research topics that stimulate their curiosity and raise their 
awareness.  
The simultaneous flow of information on the Internet promotes quantitative development. The 
speed of reflection of public opinion, and the speed of mobilizing investigations on topics 
spark the public’s curiosity. The Internet also offers diversified communication tools for 
participation in collective intelligence. Actors can choose to post on BBS, comment on a BBS 
post, comment on news contents, post on blogs, SNS…etc. All of these interactive 
communication tools can increase the exposure of information and the speed in which the 
information circulates. Whereas the mass media only distributes information, online 
communicational tools create a network. Resultingly, online forums not only utilize the 
broadcast of information from the mass media, but also mobilize the public by expanding 
their knowledge base and extending social networks.198 Online communicational tools are the 
foundation of co-existing, diversified perspectives and opinions on the Internet. These tools 
play an important role in guaranteeing the quality of the collective intelligence. The Internet 
allows actors to publish diversified perspective and opinion. This can stimulate the actors in 
different ways, maintaining objectivity of the collective intelligence. The Internet’s 
anonymity promotes both quantitate development and qualitative growth of collective 
intelligence. The anonymity of the Internet offers individuals a relevantly low self-censorship, 
                                                 
196 Martha McCaughey and Michael D. Ayers, Cyberactivism: Online Activism in Theory and Practice 
(Routledge, 2003). 
197 Ronald J. Deibert, Access Controlled: The Shaping of Power, Rights, and Rule in Cyberspace (MIT Press, 
2010); Morozov. 
198 McCaughey and Ayers. 
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in comparison to mass media journalists. Subsequently, actors can autonomously post 
findings and communicate each other – this ultimately initiated the HFS movement.      
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6 Bypass Censorship with Microblogs 
In this chapter, I selected the case of artist and political activist Ai Weiwei in order to analyze 
how an individual with high social status can mobilize the power to resist the Chinese 
authority’s oppression by utilizing the Internet. Ai was accused of tax evasion by the 
government and charged a penalty fine by the government. Ai raised the amount for the fine 
by publishing a money raising campaign online. During this event, Microblogs were primarily 
used to promote the campaign. I will analyze the function of Microblogs and how they 
promote bypass the authority’s censorship; the first segment of this chapter will be an 
introduction to Microblogs. The second segment will be overview of Ai Weiwei. In the last 
segment, I will discuss the case and how collective intelligence was practiced. Through this 
case analysis, I will examine if and how the Internet democratizes information and thus offers 
the advanced public sphere an avenue for mobilizing power. 
6.1 Microblogs: Twitter and Chinese Weibo (微博) 
Microblogs are an online communication platform, combined with IM (Instant Messaging), 
blog and social network figures. Users post short messages called “Micro posts”199 of 140 
words or less. Therefore, Micro posts can be spread to the public in a short and simple fashion. 
Because of this feature, Microblogs perform more in a broadcasting manner as opposed to 
simple one on one communication. Moreover, individuals in Microblogs are strongly linked 
to each other, this helps to build and expand the network easily because networks and content 
are publicly visible by default. Twitter is best representative of a Microblog site. After 
launching in 2006, Twitter quickly grew in the global market, ranking as the 11th biggest 
website in the world by 2012.200 In the field of Social network services, Twitter is ranked as 
the 3rd biggest website in the world with over 200 million active users.201  
Microblogging services came to China in 2007. The first Chinese Microblog sites such as 
fanfou.com, Tao Tao site202 and Twitter were not very popular. But these Microblogs played 
                                                 
199 Steffen Lohmann and others, ‘Visual Analysis of Microblog Content Using Time-varying Co-occurrence 
Highlighting in Tag Clouds’, in Proceedings of the International Working Conference on Advanced Visual 
Interfaces, 2012, pp. 753–756 <http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2254701> [accessed 18 March 2013]. 
200 ‘Alexa Top 500 Global Sites’ <http://www.alexa.com/topsites> [accessed 19 March 2013]. 
201 ‘New Instagram Stats: 90 Million Monthly Active Users’, Social Fresh 
<http://socialfresh.com/1000instagram/> [accessed 2 May 2013]. 
202 Tao Tao is launched by one of the major portal site company ‘Tencent group.’ The site is shutdown Jan, 2010. 
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their role in broadcasting information, especially information not covered by mass media in 
China. In February, 2009, when traditional news outlets responded with usual caution to a 
sensitive story (a suspicious fire near the new headquarters of state broadcaster CCTV), they 
were outflanked by witnesses on the streets of Beijing breaking the story on Twitter.203  
Microblogging was becoming a prompt reporting medium. However, the Chinese authority 
observed several phenomena of “Twitter revolution” in Arab nations which alarmed them. In 
July, 2009, the authority spotted that information about ethnic riots in Urumqi (capital of 
Xinjiang) where the region with ethnic unrest was actively being distributed on Twitter. As a 
result, Twitter was permanently shut down in China.204 After Twitter was blocked, Chinese 
portal site enterprises – agreeing to keep information flows under control - started to evolve 
into the Chinese Microblog market.205 Chinese Microblogs began to receive their own names, 
such as “Weibo” (微博: Translated version of “Microblog”). The Chinese private enterprise 
Sina Corporation controls the second largest web portal site in China (www.sina.com.cn).206 
In 2009, the Sina Corporation was the first company to present the Microblog censorship and 
the control proposal to the government. With approval from the government, the Sina 
Corporation entered the domestic Microblog market under the name “Sina Weibo (新浪微
博).”207 Sina Weibo thus became the first, and subsequently, most successful Microblog 
platform to be authorized after the clampdown in 2009.208 And the Renaissance of Chinese 
Microblogs arose. Sina Weibo was launched in August, 2009. Approximately two months 
later, the site had reached 1 million users. By end of April, 2010, the number of registered 
users raised 1000% with users numbering 10 million. By 2011, Sina Weibo controlled over 87% 
of the domestic Microblog market share.209 Thus in China, Sina Weibo is almost synonymous 
with Chinese Microblogging. 
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According to the report from the China Internet Network Information Center (CINIC), the 
number of Chinese Microblog users reached 309 million in December, 2012.210 This means 
that more than half of all Chinese Internet users have a Microblog account.211 Smart phones 
are a key factor in this rapid growth, the number of mobile Internet users reached 420 million 
in 2012 with an 18.1% yearly growth rate.212 Among Microblog users, more than 65% of 
users-202 million Microbloggers access Microblogs with Mobile devices. This indicates the 
strong correlation between smartphones and Microblogs in China.213  
Although the censorship proposal was initiated by major Chinese enterprises, Chinese 
Microblog Weibo still plays a large role in broadcasting “unpleasant” information, similar to 
Twitter before it was banned. It is often observed that Weibo rapidly broadcasts an accident or 
sensitive information until it is censored. For example, in 2012, the high-profile leadership 
contender Bo Xilai was suspended from his key political posts and his wife Gu Kailai was 
detained for the suspected murder of a British businessman, it was one of the biggest political 
scandals of the year. Weibo users received advanced warning of almost every development in 
the unfolding scandal. A post predicting Bo’s dismissal as Party secretary of Chongqing 
circulated widely before the official announcement. And claims that his wife had poisoned a 
British businessman emerged weeks before official statement.214 This indicates that even 
though Weibo sphere is under the systemized control of ISPs and that the highly domestic 
environment of the site challenges international information-flow, it still functions in a role of 
democratizing information with its’ special features. 
6.2 Who is Ai Weiwei? 
In this case analysis, it is important to briefly give some information about Ai Weiwei. 
Because after all, the social position of Ai had a certain level of impact in the case. Ai is a 
Chinese contemporary artist with a global reputation. In addition, he is also a political and 
human-rights activist. 
                                                 
210 第 31次中国互联网络发展状况统计报告 (中国互联网络信息中心(China Internet Network Information 
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Ai studied art in New York from 1983 to 1993 and was one of the first generations to study 
abroad after Chinese reforms in the late 1970s. He gained a reputation for having adding a 
liberalistic air to Chinese contemporary art culture in the early 90s, a dark-period of creative-
works after the Tiananmen pre-democracy movement. Soon, he successfully held art 
exhibitions around world, with particular popularity in Europe. In China, Ai is also 
recognized for being the son of Ai Qing. One of China’s finest modern poets, Ai Qing was 
purged for being a liberalist in the 1950s after being denounced as “an enemy of the state and 
a rightist” by the Anti-Right movement.215 Because of his father, Ai has always been linked to 
political struggle. By that, he has its source in classical liberalism which supposed to be 
influenced by his father and obtained natural reaction to what the social and political situation 
is about.216 
From 2006, Ai started actively using the Internet platform to express his criticism and 
dissident opinions against the Party system. Resultantly, Ai received the nickname “Online 
Activist.”217 For instance, he posted a criticism about the government on his own blog and 
communicated with the public about human rights almost every day until the blog was shut 
down by the authority in 2009. Many of his blog posts contained very direct criticism against 
the government and the Party system. In example, on July 15th, 2006, he criticized the 
Chinese media’s propaganda by writing “The media should cover a story of social movement 
which conflict with the police as a ‘nonstandard assault on police in an abnormal society,’ or 
‘the people bite back’ rather than “mob assault” in China.”218 He also directly spoke about 
freedom of speech by saying “As long as we follow the firm leadership of the Communist 
Party of China, any unlawful attempts to fragment the motherland, and even criminal 
activities that don’t attempt to fragment the motherland, will ultimately come to a bad end.”219 
In 2007, Ai publicly criticized the Beijing Olympics and said “I would feel ashamed if I just 
designed something for glamour or to show some kind of fake image.” 220 This interview was 
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not published in China. 221  However, because Ai was the designer of the symbolic Olympic 
“Bird Nest Stadium,” and the first high-profiled Chinese person who challenged the spirit of 
the Olympic,222  he received mass attention from the international media. Ai status as a public 
figure in the world was thus elevated. Because of this interview, Ai became internationally 
identified as a political activist in addition to being an artist. In China, Ai was publicly 
recognized as an activist in 2009. The 2009 earthquake in Si Chuan province, killed many 
young students because of poorly constructed schools which should have managed by the 
government. In the aftermath of the earthquake, authorities attempted to manipulate the total 
number of dead students to hide the government’s poor construction management. The 
authorities clearly noticed Ai’s potential to provoke mass protest, so they shut down Ai’s blog 
for the first seven days after the earthquake.223 Once the blog was opened again, Ai launched 
his own project to investigate the real number of student deaths. He reported on the project 
status online every day. It gave the Chinese public a strong recognition of Ai as a political 
dissident, but it was also Ai’s strongest and most direct conflict with the authority.224As a 
result, his blog was officially shut down in May, 2009. Ai created Microblogging accounts on 
sites such as Twitter and Weibo and continued to communicate with the public after his blog 
was shut down. With diversified communication tools on the Internet, Ai continued to interact 
with the public and spread his dissident opinions about the Chinese government. At the same 
time, the authority continued its efforts to stifle Ai’s voice. For instance, a studio in Shanghai 
that had been designed by Ai was demolished by the authority. Ai’s reaction was sending an 
invitation to the public via Microblogs to gather at the studio one day before the demolition 
and eat river crabs.225 The event was published on Ai’s Weibo and many individuals came to 
the studio on short notice.226 This indicates that Ai had continued to maintain both a direct 
and indirect conflictive position against the authority.  
Ai started as a famous Chinese artist and became a public figure. Thus, Ai always received 
national and international attention regarding his dissident activities. Ai exercises a high level 
of influential power as a public figure; Ai’s supporters call themselves “Ai mi” (艾迷: means 
                                                 
221 Alison Klayman, Ai Weiwei: Never Sorry, 2012. 
222 Klayman. 
223 Klayman. 
224 Klayman. 
225 River Crab in Chinese is He Xie (河蟹) which is the homophone of Peace, harmony (He Xie和谐). By 
arranging eating crab party, he attempted to deliver the symbolic meaning of harmonious society. 
226 Klayman. 
65 
 
Ai’s fan). And with his cultural approach, he has become a trademark for Chinese 
liberalism.227 
6.3 The Case: Ai and Microblog  
Ai’s strenuous activities as an online activist are saved via documentary, book, and interview 
journals by Ai himself and others.228 After successfully raising money via Microblog to pay a 
large fine for tax evasion, Ai became a classic example of individuals utilizing the Internet as 
a promotion tool for democratization in China.229 
However, most of these only highlight about the result of the campaign, what majorly focused 
were the fact that Ai raised big amount money with online. In other words, the empirical 
evidence or analysis to support the relationship between the Internet and democratization is 
missing. I will apply collective intelligence theory to examine before, during and after the 
campaign. From this empirical approach, I will attempt to discover how the Internet offers an 
environment allows individuals to mobilize influential power in a state where governmental 
authority dominates public rights.    
6.3.1 What Happened? 
On April 3rd, 2011, Ai tried to departure from Beijing International airport to Hong Kong. 
Chinese police arrested Ai at the airport, and detained him for 81 days. During this time, 
police raided Ai’s studio and home in Beijing and investigated the studio’s staff. His 
detention drew huge attention around the world. In an effort to keep a low profile, Ai’s 
detention was not initially published by the authority. However, the arrest elicited tremendous 
overseas response from US, EU, and British governments and drew shock and public 
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demonstrations around the world.230 Hillary Clinton expressed concerns about Ai’s detention 
on the annual global human rights report.231 
The attention from such high leveled institutions and individuals in such a short time can be 
explained by Ai’s reputation. Because his social status was not only that of a political activist, 
but also a well-known artist, his detention had a greater impact  and triggered a larger bearing 
with the world interpreting his detention as the  ‘suppression of an artist.’ Four days after the 
arrestment, the official newspaper broadcasted the event for the first time.232 The Foreign 
Ministry of China did not issue its official statement until five days after the arrest. 233 It can 
be assumed that Ai’s arrest most likely would not have been officially published in China if 
the West had not reacted so quickly and dramatically.  
81 days after the initial arrestment, Ai was released under the condition that he would not give 
any interviews, would remove himself from social media, and would not travel outside of 
Beijing. But within months, Ai was back on Twitter and speaking to the press.234 After he was 
released, the police accused him of tax evasion. On November 1st, 2011, Ai received a court 
order to pay approximately 2. 4 million USD (15 million RMB) within 15 days.235 With 
relevantly short deadline with big amount of fine looks as if allegations might have been 
substantial by the Chinese law afford the authorities a great legitimation to implement 
selective punishment. Ai realized that he had no way to collect the fine on his own and 
therefore no means to avoid being arrested again. 
A few days after the court order, Ai and his studio staff posted on several Microblogs to 
borrow money in order to pay the fine, the money raising campaign had started. His 
supporters and people who followed Ai’s Microblog began collecting money. Quickly, the 
speed of broadcasting and active participation in Microblogs began to show results. Money 
was collected with incredible speed. However, at the same time, the government sensed that 
the movement was growing in size. As a result, the authority shut down Ai’s Weibo account 
                                                 
230 Meiling Cheng, ‘Ai Weiwei: Acting Is Believing’, TDR/The Drama Review, 55 (2011), 7–13. 
231 ‘US Criticises China Rights Record’, BBC, 8 April 2011, section US and Canada 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/13017141> [accessed 20 March 2013]. 
232 ‘社评：法律不会为特立独行者弯曲_评论_环球网’ <http://opinion.huanqiu.com/roll/2011-
04/1609672.html> [accessed 18 April 2013]. 
233 ‘China Omits Ai Weiwei References’, BBC, 8 April 2011, section Asia-Pacific 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13016289> [accessed 18 April 2013]. 
234 Klayman. 
235 ‘BBC News - Ai Weiwei China Tax Bill Paid by Supporters’. 
67 
 
on November 7th, 2011.236 Ai’s Weibo account has remained blocked since then. Ai’s Chinese 
name “艾未未” also became censored in Weibo, searches for his name show the result 
“According to the political law and policy, the search result of ‘艾未未’ cannot be shown (Fig 
6.1).”237  
     
Fig 6.1) the search result of “艾未未” on Sina Weibo site  
Because the money raising campaign and Ai’s studio address were spread so quickly, the 
campaign still continued after Ai’s Weibo account was shut down. As a result, within the two 
week deadline, Ai raised almost 1.4 million USD (8.59 million RMB). Ai was able to fully 
pay the government fine by combining his own money with the money collected by the 
public.238   
After his successful campaign, the authority has paid extra attention to Ai’s public activities. 
For example, in late 2012, Ai published a music video on the Chinese version of YouTube, 
tuduo.com. The music video criticized the authority’s censorship by parodying the Korean 
pop-song “Gangnam Style.” It was completely censored on Chinese Internet within a few 
hours.239 With limited communication mediums and highly concentrated surveillance, Ai’s 
publications on dissident ideology have been quickly flagged and censored by the authority. 
Officially, China based communication platforms such as blogs and Weibo blocked Ai’s 
accounts. Theoretically, Twitter and Google+ are blocked on the Chinese mainland by the 
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Chinese Firewall system. However, it was observed that Ai uses these platforms to continue 
to communicate with the public. Ai’s supporters still talk about Ai’s money raising campaign 
as a symbol of liberalism that encourages further discussion about sensitive political issues. 
As above, the money raising campaign and Ai’s continuous communication with the public 
can be classified extreme direct confliction between Ai and the authority. It was clear that Ai 
attempted to resist the authority and the authority, resultantly, attempted to stifle his voice. 
The Internet played a major role in empowering Ai and giving him a medium to further 
mobilize and develop that power. In the next section, I will apply collective intelligence 
theory to discuss how the Internet offers an advantageous sphere for mobilizing power.  
6.3.2 Discovery of Quantitative Expansion 
Following Ai’s detention, Microblogs played a major role in mobilizing power against the 
authority. In this section, I will analyze how power was mobilized by a quantitative expansion 
method in collective intelligence and promoted the event to the public agenda.  
When Ai was arrested at the airport on April 3rd, Microblogs were the first medium to spread 
information about the arrest to the public. The authority didn’t want to publish this event in 
the beginning. Microblogs were the most efficient tool to sidestep traditional forms of media 
and broadcast information about Ai’s arrest. The arrest was first published on Ai’s Twitter 
account by the one of his staff about 30minutes after Ai’s arrest in the airport (Fig 6.2). 240 
 
Fig 6.2) information about Ai’s disappearance, posted by Ai’s staff (left: 30 minutes after the arrest, right: 50 
minutes after the arrest)  
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Fig 6.2 shows Twitter contents which describe the situation of Ai’s arrest. The left Tweet says 
“April 3rd 2011, Ai was arrested at Beijing International Airport. Ai was separated from his 
staff and the officers took him away, Ai’s phone is off. He has lost contact for 30 
minutes…Please pay attention.” These posts were updated almost every 10 minutes with one 
the time changing; “lost contact for 30 minutes,” “for 40 minutes,” “50 minutes,” etc. The 
status of Ai’s arrestment was being broadcasted live. The speed of the internet made it 
possible for to be reported live to the public. Here, “speed of the Internet” refers to the timing 
of delivery of information between the information-producer and the receiver. And this was 
advantageous to form the public attention and opinion (collectivity) in short time which 
promoted quantitative development on the event. In addition, another quick speed can be 
underlined which is the speed between the event and the broadcasting. With mobile phones 
now operating as Internet devices, the Internet sphere has become ubiquitous and de-
located.241 Resultingly, it made the occurrence of events and the events publication to be 
nearly simultaneous. Whereas the mass media censored before the publication mechanism, 
the above features of the Internet operates on a publication first mechanism which challenges 
the authority’s ability to cover stories quietly.  
Secondly, it was observed that Internet’s diversified platform promoted quantitative 
development. When Ai received the court order to pay the fine for tax evasion, he used 
several Microblog accounts to release information. Three of the major Microblogs were used; 
Sina Weibo,242 Twitter, and Google + (fig.6.3: left). Ai and his staff used several Microblog 
accounts to actively inform followers and the public about this event. Such diversified 
platforms were advantageous in raising quantitative development. Although some Chinese 
access Twitter through websites that skirt the Chinese firewall, officially it is blocked in 
China. Ai and his staff primarily used Twitter to reach Western followers and Weibo to reach 
Chinese followers. Through diversified Microblog accounts, Ai maximized exposer about his 
situation to the national and international public. 
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Fig 6.3: left) Ai Weiwei’s Google+ page with a picture of the government notice 
Fig 6.4: right) Ai’s staff Twitter posted the government notice with an external blog link for the full text243  
The fig 6.4: right) is a Tweet from one of Ai’s staff on her account, which wrote “Ai Weiwei 
is Not Free Yet; Look Fake Company’s tax bureau final order notification full text.244” She 
led readers to read the full text of the notice from the government. Since Twitter limits the 
number of characters in a tweet, she simply added an external blog link to the full published 
contents of the government order. When readers clicked the external blog link, they could 
directly enter the blog and read the full text without any additional process. The sender (the 
staff) utilized different types of platforms with different advantages. In this case, diversified 
types of Internet media, not just diversified Microblog accounts, were utilized. She used the 
Microblog as a platform to raise the efficiency of broadcasting. The blog service was used to 
offer readers fuller content, with a picture of the government order presented to raise 
persuasive power over the reader. It is more convincing and raises more sentiment to show the 
full text of the court order and the picture than only broadcasting text via Micro posts, such as 
“Ai is accused for tax evasion and got the court order to pay a fine.” By utilizing diversified 
tools with easy interchangeability, the Internet boosts quantitate development (high efficiency 
of broadcasting by Twitter) as facts become more convincing. From the readers’ perspective, 
diversified tools raise the qualitative development, because they can receive more information 
than the simple Micro-post. It is advantageous for the readers in that they can be further 
stimulated by diversified information.  
Before I account further findings in quantitative development, it is important to understand 
the “@” function of Microblogs, one of the key features to Microblog broadcasting. For 
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instance, in fig 6.4: right) Ai’s staff member wrote “@aiww” and “@puzhiqiang.” By using 
the “@,” her content was shown on Ai’s main Twitter page and subsequently was shown to 
Ai’s followers. In Twitter, “@”is essentially a tagging function that expands the exposure of 
the content.  When Ai’s staff member posted content on her main Twitter page, it was not 
only exposed on her page, but also exposed on the main page of two other accounts; “aiww” 
and “puzhiqiang.” Using the “@” function, her Tweet was exposed to over 250 thousand 
people.245 Additionally, 10 people Retweeted (sharing function) the post, so this information 
was displayed on 13 individual’s main pages. If “@” was not added, the content would have 
only been exposed to two types of users; 1) those who are already following this person, 2) 
those who visit this person’s main Twitter page. But she added “@aiww” and 
“@puzhiqiang,” so the content is shown to; 1) users who are following this person, 2) users 
who visit this person’s main Twitter page, 3) users who visit “aiww” main Twitter page, 4) 
users who visit “puzhiqiang’s” main page. I call this function of Twitter and other Microblogs 
as “Networked Broadcasting Method.” The simple “@” function raises the capacity to 
broadcast information at a higher level, which significantly promotes quantitative expansion. 
Exposer to a larger public means stimulating a larger public’s curiosity and thus recruiting 
more participants.  
A third example of quantitative development was observed by this “@” function. Networked 
broadcasting method promoted significant quantitative development, especially during the 
money raising campaign. The money raising campaign was started on November 3rd, 2011, 
via Micro-posts by Ai and his staff.   
 
Fig 6.5) Ai’s money raising campaign on his Twitter246 
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Fig 6.5) Ai’s Tweet; “Please lend me money, I will pay it back no matter if I win or 
lose……D-day is in 12 days.”247 Ai’s staff also uploaded Micro-posts on how to lend money 
to him (Fig 6.6-6.7).  
 
 
Fig 6.6: top) Ai’s staff posting a money raising ad on Twitter which also mentions Weibo activities248  
Fig 6.7: bottom) Ai’s staff member’s money raising ad on her Twitter249 
Fig 6.6: top) says “@aiww at Sina Weibo…Yes, I don’t want to borrow money…but I will 
borrow the money…You can directly send money by post: Beijing, Chaoyang district …”250 
By this Tweet, we can understand that the money raising campaign was also broadcasted via 
Sina Weibo. Fig 6.7: bottom) contains several specific methods to lend Ai money. This 
information was spread quickly by using the “@” function. Many individuals who followed 
Ai’s plight not only sent money, but also spread his studio address through their own network 
in order to encourage others to send money to his house. 
 
Fig 6.8) four different Twitter users spreading Ai’s home address on November 3rd251 
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Fig 6.8) shows a high dissemination of information. With networked broadcasting method, 
four individuals raised the efficiency of broadcasting to a great level. The first user lists eight 
@, which means that this information was shown on a total of nine user’s main pages 
(including the user himself). The @ function on Twitter maximized a way for users to 
participate in the movement; it transformed the individuals’ role as not only an information 
receiver, but also as a broadcaster. This maximized the efficiency of recruiting participants 
and promoting quantitative development in a short time. In the money raising process, 
individuals could participate in two different ways; A) by sending money to Ai, which 
increased the quantitative development of the campaign, B) by @ and Retweeting, individuals 
promoted the advertisement of the campaign and became directly involved with recruitment 
process (expansion of public attention). With the combination of A) and B), the event spread 
rapidly with explosive broadcasting capacity.  
The amount raised by the campaign illustrates the significant power of Microblog 
broadcasting. 12 hours after the money raising campaign was published, more than 5232 
supporters raised money for Ai.252 The status of the campaign was broadcasted daily by Ai 
and Ai’s staff via Microblogs. According to the Twitter from Ai’s staff, at 22:00 on 
November 4th, the total amount raised was almost 160,000 USD less than a million RMB (fig 
6.9 top). By November 5th, the amount raised had nearly tripled, reaching over 400,000USD - 
more than 2.5million RMB (fig 6.9 bottom). 
 
Fig 6.9) Ai’s staff’s money raising status report on Twitter, November 4th and 5th253 
According to research, Weibo users in China are relatively well educated (more than one-third 
have a university degree, and 10% a higher degree), professional (28% work in the 
Information Technology Industry) and coastal-metropolitan (Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, 
Zhejiang, Jiangsu and Fujian residents account for two-thirds of respondents).254 Ai’s money 
raising campaign which started from Microblogs, had a noticeable’ impact on the mass 
                                                 
252 ‘BBC News - Ai Weiwei China Tax Bill Paid by Supporters’. 
253 ‘Twitter 艳萍 (duyanpili)’. 
254 Sullivan, ‘A Tale of Two Microblogs in China’. 
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public’s agenda in a relatively short period. Not only wealthy and influential individuals, but 
also the general public came to Ai’s studio address to throw money over the wall. By the 
November 5th, 2011, the money raised by studio visitor reached over 25,000USD (fig 6.9).255 
The below example illustrates how Ai bypassed the authority’s shutdown of his Weibo 
account and continued to encourage collective intelligence from the quantitative development 
perspective. 
After Ai’s Chinese Weibo and blog were censored during the money raising campaign, a new 
Weibo page appeared under the user name “Ma Lei Ge Bi” (in Chinese: 马勒戈壁. fig 6.10). 
It was Ai’s new Weibo.256  
 
Fig. 6.10) Ai’s Weibo with the new user name “马勒戈壁” 
Compared with his previous Weibo and blog, Ai writes less about his direct criticism of the 
authority and democratic ideology. However, in this platform, he still continues to 
communication with the public.  
According to Guobin Yang, the methods of resisting power through digital forms are called 
“digital hidden transcripts.”257 One of these digital hidden transcripts is called “online guerilla 
war.” Online guerilla war is when one person controls multiple accounts.  Ai continues to 
resist the government’s censorship by using this type of hidden transcript. If a website is shut 
down, technology now makes it easy for an individual to open another.258 Ai continuously 
creates new broadcasting platforms to communicate with the public and build networks with 
less censorship. It is not difficult to create new Weibo accounts, which means that he can 
                                                 
255 Klayman. 
256 ‘马勒戈壁--的微博 新浪微博-随时随地分享身边的新鲜事儿’ 
<http://www.weibo.com/u/3080105675?topnav=1&wvr=5&topsug=1&profile_ftype=1> [accessed 4 April 
2013]. 
257 Guobin Yang, The Power of the Internet in China: Citizen Activism Online (Columbia University Press, 
2009). 
258 Yang, p 60-61. 
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easily remobilize his collective following whenever of his accounts is deleted.  It can be said 
that the Internet offers information and knowledge in a way that increases its exposure and 
helps it to survive censorship. This is directly connected with the idea of collective 
intelligence. In mass media, information is less likely to survive once it has been censored. On 
the Internet, individuals can recruit more participants to interact and mobilize public opinion 
by creating multiple social media accounts. In sum, “online guerilla war” strategy in digital 
hidden transcripts promotes information to raise quantitative development and become an 
influential power by offering increased exposure to the public. 
Ai’s new Weibo account name illustrates another type of the digital hidden transcript, 
linguistic strategy. His user name “Ma Lei Ge Bi” originally means Mahler Gobi, but it is 
homophone of “your mother's fucking cunt.” In the Internet sphere, the second meaning of 
“Ma Lei Ge Bi” is the one generally recognized. For Ai, this is a curse towards the authority 
and the censorship. In his short film and performances, this word often appears to curse the 
Chinese authority and criticize censorship.259 With a linguistic hidden transcript strategy, Ai 
could indirectly express dissident opinions that would otherwise be filtered right away. A 
linguistic strategy typically promotes qualitative growth. With a linguistic hidden transcript, 
diversified information and knowledge can be combined, offering the public an independent 
public sphere. However, in the case of Ai’s new account, it could be said that a linguistic 
hidden transcript offered Ai the possibility to expose to the public his political standpoint. 
This made his new account easily recognizable and easily regained the public’s attention. 
6.3.3 Discovery of Qualitative growth 
During this case analysis, several distinguishable qualitative growth patterns that promoted 
influential power were observed.  
The first instance of qualitative growth was observed during Ai’s arrest in the airport. On the 
same day, the police raided Ai’s studio in Beijing and took several computers. Ai’s staffs and 
wife were investigated. This situation was broadcasted by his staffs to individuals outside of 
the studio via Twitter. Below fig 6.11) shows three different individuals posting on different 
Twitter accounts about the studio being raided. On the top of fig 6.11), Ai’s staff Tweeted 
                                                 
259 草泥马祖国 Fuck Your Motherland, 2012 
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OXtHw42aXg0&feature=youtube_gdata_player> [accessed 4 April 2013]; 
Ai Weiwei Sing Grass Mud Horse Fuck Song for His Lenders艾未未唱草泥馬之歌英文字幕版, 2011 
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nsk-KgD0aOM&feature=youtube_gdata_player> [accessed 4 April 2013]. 
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with Ai’s Twitter account “The studio staff and volunteers were taken away by the police 
officer for investigation. Ai’s wife is at home with a police officer. Now, the front and back 
door of the studio are surrounded by police officers. Not possible to go in.”260 In the second 
post, another staff posted on the situation from her Twitter account that “Now the police still 
at @aiww studio. Studio has police tape rolled around it. Cars are not allowed to drive past. 
Today the police searched the place where Ai’s two year old son is living.”261 On the third 
Twitter of below fig 6.11), a user paying attention to the case spread a post written by staff 
who was inside the studio when it was raided. He wrote “Ai Weiwei’s studio staffs are locked 
in the studio……FeiFei’s Sina Weibo is @feifei0621: Now front and back door are 
surrounded by the police. We cannot go out.”262  
 
 Fig 6.11) Reports from several Twitter users who were on the spot when the police raided Ai’s studio 
The Internet’s ubiquity on mobile phones raises quantitative development enabling 
information to stream live. It also presents events and information from different angles as it’ 
published by different positions as three different users posted about the police raid (fig 6.11). 
However, each post contained different information. All three posters were in different 
locations when the raid happened; the first post was from a person outside of the studio (The 
user used the word “cannot go in (无法进去)”), the second post was from a person who was 
inside the studio, the third post was a forwarded post from an individual inside of the studio 
(The user used the word “cannot go out (不让出去)”). These three posts also contain different 
content; one says “volunteers were taken away” another says “the police searched the place 
where Ai’s two year old son lives.” The actors utilized the ubiquity of the Internet to update 
information about what they seeing from their own positions. By that, the event could be 
                                                 
260 The post is translated by the author, original post from ‘Twitter 艾未未 Ai Weiwei (aiww)’. 
261 The post is translated by the author, original post from‘Twitter 艳萍 (duyanpili)’. 
262 ‘Twitter 莫之许 (mozhixu)’ <https://twitter.com/mozhixu> [accessed 21 March 2013]. 
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informed to the public with rich contents which offers the event to be more persuasive. It 
literately demonstrated “No one knows everything, but everybody know something”263 
method. In the process of collective intelligence, these diversified angles on the information 
of the event sparked the curiosity of readers. An abundance of fully detailed information 
raises persuasive power. From the collective intelligence context, information about an event 
not being covered by the mass media maximized qualitative growth by stimulating individuals’ 
curiosity. 
The second example of qualitative growth in this case was observed after Ai’s tax evasion and 
the government fine. Before the money raising campaign started, Ai and his staff broadcasted 
information about the tax bomb. The public reacted immediately, but in different ways, on 
Twitter.  
 
Fig 6.12: left) BBC news and Foreign Policy Initiative (FPI)’s Twitter accounts broadcasted Ai’s tax fine issue 
on November 1st264  
Fig 6.13: right) One of Ai’s followers uploaded a Singaporean newspaper report about Ai’s tax fine265  
The public’s reactions on Twitter (fig 6.12 and13) illustrate one of the major features of the 
Internet sphere; the Internet sphere is a highly de-territorialized sphere. Fig 6.12: left shows a 
UK based International news media BBC and US based human right organization FPI’s 
broadcasting about Ai’s taxi fine issue. At the same time, one of the Ai’s followers, Zhou 
Shuguang (周曙光), who is also investigation journalist with his Twitter account @zuola 
updated the picture of Singaporean newspaper article regarding Ai’s tax fine issue with his 
comment “At breakfast, I saw the newspaper with the title of ‘Ai is fined 7million.’ 7million 
                                                 
263 Lévy. 
264 ‘BBC Newshour (BBCNewshour) on Twitter’ <https://twitter.com/BBCNewshour> [accessed 31 March 
2013]; ‘FPI (ForeignPolicyI) on Twitter’ <https://twitter.com/ForeignPolicyI> [accessed 31 March 2013]. 
265 ‘佐拉Ⓥ (zuola) on Twitter’ <https://twitter.com/zuola> [accessed 31 March 2013]. 
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is Singapore dollar (fig 6.13: right).”266 All of these contents from BBC, FPI and Zhou were 
from different locations and nationalities. In addition, all of their posts added “@aiww” so 
that it also posted on Ai’s main Twitter page. This allowed users who were already following 
Ai further access to alternative media coverage. International media and organizations 
broadcasted this tax evasion case very differently from the Chinese mass media. For instance, 
whereas the western media focused on Ai as a political dissident, the central government 
media institution huanqiu.com (环球网)267 more underlined Ai as a tax criminal by saying 
“What never changes is that Ai’s tax evasion is a fact...”268  
The readers are not only just experiencing simple fact that how the other locations 
broadcasting about the event, but also acknowledging cultural, political differences by 
contacting these contrasting and different contents from different territories. So in here, de-
territorialized sphere is referred to “communicative de-territorialization”269 rather than simple 
geographical de-territorialization. Communicative de-territorialization realizes trans-local 
connections between different ‘present contexts’ across various territories.270  The Internet 
offers the public both censored and uncensored information. And with modern, globalizing 
tendencies, the distinctiveness of any particular national variant of media content and 
institution is being reduced.271 From the geographical de-territorialization perspective, the 
Internet public sphere is a global sphere - advantageous in raising quantitative development. 
What should be highlighted here is the successful synergy of qualitative growth and 
communicative de-territorialization. Communicative de-territorialization promotes qualitative 
growth by shaping collective intelligence with international, multifaceted perspectives on the 
same issue. Communicative de-territorialization enables the Internet to be more independent 
and neural than traditional media, especially media produced under a centralized political-
power structure.   
                                                 
266 Translated to English by the author 
267 huanqiu.com (环球网) is the website version of Huanqiu Shibao (环球时报). Huanqiu.com is invested by 
central government online newspaper people.com.cn (人民网) which is online version of People’s Daily (人民
日报). It is the one of sub-organization of people.com.cn.  
268 Translated to English by the author, original content in Chinese is “第一个变不了的, 是艾未未有偷逃税的
事实…” Original content from huanqiu.com cannot be found, but founded new can be found at ‘单仁平：艾未
未“借钱还税”搞得太戏剧性 - 时评 - 21CN.COM’ 
<http://news.21cn.com/today/topic/2011/11/07/9698184.shtml> [accessed 1 April 2013]. 
269 Andreas Hepp, ‘New Media Connectivity: a New World of Mobility? The Internet, Identity and 
Deterritorialization in Europe’, Brooksbank Jones, Anny/Cross, Máire: Internet Identities in Europe. Sheffield: 
University of Sheffield. http://www shef. ac. uk/content/1/c6/04/88/28/Hepp.pdf [31.12. 2005], 2005. 
270 Hepp. 
271 McQuail, p.41. 
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Thirdly, it was observed that the search engine offered the individuals the control of the 
information and promoted qualitative growth in significant level. Accessing forbidden sites 
from mainland China is not so difficult for individuals with certain technologies. It is 
estimated that over 100,000 Chinese were on Google+ and 20,000 on Twitter in 2011.272 
Access to Twitter is blocked in China But, in the case of Ai’s money raising campaign, 
Twitter was one of the major broadcasting platforms used. Curious, I attempted to discover 
how the mainland Chinese public could access Twitter. The result was that it is not so 
difficult to learn how to access Twitter, instructions can be easily found using the Chinese 
Baidu search engine. In addition, since the trend if using mobile devices to access the Internet, 
Apps joined with additional technology to also allow easy access to Twitter. As below (fig 
6.14), the search result of “怎么上推特 (in English: How to access Twitter) produced over 
6.5million results on Baidu.  
 
Fig 6.14) Search result of 怎么上推特 on Baidu273 
                                                 
272 ‘Chinese Take Creative Approach to Internet Censorship | Stanford Knowledgebase’ 
<http://www.stanford.edu/group/knowledgebase/cgi-bin/2011/11/29/chinese-take-creative-approach-to-internet-
censorship/> [accessed 2 April 2013]. 
273 ‘怎么上推特_百度搜索’ 
<http://www.baidu.com/s?wd=%E6%80%8E%E4%B9%88%E4%B8%8A%E6%8E%A8%E7%89%B9&rsv_bp
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Some results shows how to log into Twitter with a PC, some results shows how to log in 
Twitter with a mobile phone by downloading certain kinds of technologies (Apps). It is not 
difficult to understand that the number of Chinese Twitter users has increased since 2011. 
Yang classifies technologies used to bypass the authority’s censorship as technical hidden 
transcripts.274 The digital hidden transcripts are reflecting both political conditions and human 
creativity under the condition of censorship.275 The government is well aware of the public’s 
strategy for bypassing control; officials have been ordering Chinese media outlets to 
“strengthen information management” and “Crack down on false rumors”276 since 2011. It is 
also said that a high capacity to customize Internet technology can result in even higher 
censorship than traditional media.277 So how should we interpret 6.5 million search results 
with instructions on how to connect to Twitter? Few individuals have the prior knowledge 
required to modify software code and create programs that bypass government censorship to 
log into Twitter. Some of those individuals who do have this knowledge have posted 
strategies online for access forbidden sites. Search engines help to distribute this information 
by making it easier to find. For society with high information-censorship, such as China, this 
could significantly raise collective intelligence and qualitative growth. After all, the authority 
simply cannot control all of the information available on the Internet. Search engines offers 
actors control over the information flow. For instance, if an actor is curious about certain 
events, a search engine can offer the initiative to control and manage further investigation and 
research by offer relevant information and knowledge. 
  
Fig 6.15: left) Ai’s Twitter profile278    Fig 6.16: right) content regarding the authority censorship in Ai’s 
Twitter279 
                                                                                                                                                        
=0&ch=&tn=baidu&bar=&rsv_spt=3&ie=utf-
8&rsv_sug3=13&rsv_sug=0&rsv_sug4=29236&rsv_sug1=3&inputT=14183> [accessed 3 April 2013]. 
274 Yang. 
275 Yang. 
276 ‘Chinese Take Creative Approach to Internet Censorship | Stanford Knowledgebase’. 
277 Morozov. 
278 ‘Twitter 艾未未 Ai Weiwei (aiww)’. 
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Fig 6.15: left) is Ai’s Twitter profile. Ai is still actively communicating with his followers. 
For example, he posted and forwarded over 20 Tweets on April 1st, 2013. His political 
ideology for freedom of speech and public rights is still continuously broadcasted. For 
example, in fig 6.16: right), he wrote “……was arrested......At the last interrogation, they 
suddenly asked about Jasmine.280 Answer was: It is a kind of flower that smells very good. 
Then I got released. I have no clue why he asked such question till now”281 
Comparing activity on Ai’s Weibo and Twitter accounts, it is clear that Twitter is the public 
sphere with less censorship. And if the public wants access to a blocked public sphere with 
less censorship, search engines provide the opportunity to easily compare information with 
what is presented in mass media. Search engines function as a bridge. Resultingly, by offering 
the opportunity to access diversified information, individuals can contact with different 
perspective and opinions on independent spheres which promote qualitative growth.  
Fourthly, it was observed that the public’s digital linguistic hidden transcript was utilized for 
qualitative growth. Previously, Ai’s Weibo account, with its linguistic hidden transcripts, was 
classified as quantitative development. However, when the public uses linguistic hidden 
transcripts, it can be classified as qualitative growth, because they ultimately raise neutrality 
and the independence of information on the Internet.   
After the money raising campaign, all of Ai’s Weibo accounts and public communication 
platforms became censored and content containing his name were filtered. However, Ai and 
other individuals found strategies to continue to interact with each other, sharing information 
on the Internet. 
After the public recognized that searching or writing Ai’s Chinese name “艾未未” would be 
useless since it was censored immediately, they decided to refer him as “艾神 (Ai Shen: 
means Ai God).” By referring Ai as 艾神, the public could avoid the authority’s censorship, 
continue their communication, and maintain and develop the collective’s intelligence. By 
referring to Air as “神 (god),” users expressed their worship and support of Ai. This 
expression can be found everywhere, search engine results, BBS, Blogs, etc. For instance, on 
                                                                                                                                                        
279 ‘Twitter 艾未未 Ai Weiwei (aiww)’. 
280 The meaning of Jasmine could be interpreted as “Jasmine revolution.” 
281 Translated to English by the author, original text in Chinese from fig 6.16: right) are “……被擒……最后一
次审审审,突然审及茉莉花,答日:一审味道很想的花,之后被审放.至今不解其故” 
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April 4th, 2013, I inputted the keyword “艾未未”. The first result page only showed content 
that introduced Ai as an artist and the authority’s official news content regarding Ai’s tax 
evasion. Using the keyword “艾未未,” none of the public’s discussion or comments from 
Microblogs, BBS, or SNS appeared on the first page of results.282 Next, I inputted the 
keyword “艾神”. The results on the first page were one BBS site, “Baidu Tieba (百度贴吧),” 
and a blog post.283 
However, censorship of content relating to Ai was implemented far more strictly on Weibo. 
Ai’s last movement which was published to public agenda was by Microblog. The authority 
has noticed the speed in which Weibo can mobilize the public’s opinion. After Ai’s Chinese 
name “艾未未” was censored, the alternative keyword “Ai god (艾神)” also became censored 
on Weibo. When searching Weibo for “艾神,” the result says “According to the political law 
and policy, the search result of ‘艾神’ cannot be shown (fig 6.17)” - the same result as when 
searching for “艾未未.” Following the censorship of ‘艾神,’ Ai’s followers started to refer to 
him online as “艾婶 (Ai Shen).” In this name, “婶 (Shen)” originally means a wife of an 
uncle. But here, “婶” is only used to because it is a homophone of “神.” So by changing “神” 
to “婶,” the public could avoid the authority’s censorship. Since the new name was a 
homophone, users quickly adjusted their searches and continued to develop the collective 
intelligence. In Weibo, searching for “艾婶” results in 18,308 hits -most of the results are 
related to Ai (fig 6.18). 
 
                                                 
282 ‘艾未未_百度搜索’ 
<http://www.baidu.com/s?wd=%E8%89%BE%E6%9C%AA%E6%9C%AA&pn=0&ie=utf-8&usm=2> 
[accessed 4 April 2013]. 
283 ‘艾神_百度搜索’ <http://www.baidu.com/s?ie=utf-
8&bs=%E8%89%BE%E6%9C%AA%E6%9C%AA&f=8&rsv_bp=1&rsv_spt=3&wd=%E8%89%BE%E7%A5
%9E&rsv_sug3=6&rsv_sug=0&rsv_sug4=2712&rsv_sug1=2&inputT=5078> [accessed 4 April 2013]. 
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Fig 6.17) search results for “艾神 (Ai Shen)” on Weibo284 
 
Fig 6.18) search results for “艾婶 (Ai Shen)” on Weibo285     
Individuals referencing the name “艾婶” are well aware of Ai’s political background. 
Therefore, many of the search results generated by searching for this name contain political 
meaning. For example, one result shows a strong frustration from a user directed at the 
governmental authority by writing “…Students who were taught to call 110 (police) in brutal 
situations found out that the police officers who should help people are staring at the us, full 
of hate, isn’t it frustrating?…Ai Shen (艾婶) said that it is entering the criminal domain if you 
try to know your own real nation (Fig 6.19: top).”286  
                                                 
284 ‘艾神的相关微博 - 新浪微博’ 
<http://s.weibo.com/weibo/%25E8%2589%25BE%25E7%25A5%259E&Refer=STopic_box> [accessed 3 April 
2013]. 
285 ‘艾婶的相关微博 - 新浪微博’ 
<http://s.weibo.com/weibo/%25E8%2589%25BE%25E5%25A9%25B6&Refer=STopic_box> [accessed 3 April 
2013]. 
286 Translated to English by the author, original contents in Chinese is “面对他们这般野蛮,自小接受教育的学
生拿起电话打 110，却发现我所要求助的警察叔叔坐在对面恶恶恨恨的看着父老乡亲.这能不让人绝望…
艾婶讲, 当你试图了解自己国家的时候,就走上了犯罪的道路…” ‘艾婶的相关微博 - 新浪微博’ 
<http://s.weibo.com/weibo/%25E8%2589%25BE%25E5%25A9%25B6&page=2> [accessed 5 April 2013]. 
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Fig 6.19: top) search result of 艾婶 on Weibo example #1   Fig 6.20: bottom) search result of 艾婶 on Weibo 
example #2 
Direct complaints about the authority’s censorship were also observed (fig 6.20: bottom) in 
another search result, the post says “Ai Shen (艾婶) paid back my money, is this sensitive 
too?” This user also uploaded a captured picture of the Internet administration’s message 
about censorship, it says “The notice from the system administration: Sorry…Your Weibo 
contents ‘I just received 1001RMB…..@ Ai Weiwei (艾未未)’ has been censored by the 
administrator. This Weibo message is not suitable for publication to the public…”287 Contents 
which are not suitable for publication are continually being published on Ai’s new Weibo 
account “Ma Lei Ge Bi (马勒戈壁),” which refers to Ai as “艾婶” instead of “艾未未.” 
                                                 
287 Translated to English by the author, original contents in Chinese is “艾婶换钱了,这事也敏感?.” The picture 
of the phone page capture says: “系统管理员…抱歉，您在….发表的微博 #我刚收到艾嫂的 1001元#...已
经被管理员加密.此微博不适宜对外公开…” ‘艾婶的相关微博 - 新浪微博’. 
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Linguistic hidden transcripts with euphemistic meanings are referred to in China as “Grass 
mud horse (草: Grass泥: Mud马: Horse: In Chinese this reads as “Cao Ni Ma”) lexicon.” 草
泥马 is a homophone for 肏你妈 which means “Fuck your mother” in Chinese. As Ma Lei Ge 
Bi contains “mother,” in the grass mud horse lexicon “mother” also refers to the Communist 
party. Grass mud horse is often used to express “Fuck the Party.”288 So on the Internet, “Grass 
mud horse,” “Mahler Gobi,” and “River Crab”289 are euphemistic words which are used to 
express the frustrating, negative and sarcastic opinions against the authority. This type of 
strategy obscures the use of coercion.290  
Calling Ai as “Ai God” can also be understood in the context of the Grass Mud Horse lexicon, 
in that it can also be considered a criticism of the government. From statements made by the 
government, Ai is a criminal who committed tax evasion. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs stated that he insulted the Chinese public and the Chinese nation by making the short 
film “Fuck you motherland (草泥马祖国)” and disseminating pornography.291 By referring to 
Ai as a God, the public is expressing their dissident support of Ai and mocking the 
government’s statement. 
Ai’s new Weibo name and the public’s strategy of renaming Ai in order to bypass censorship 
are important steps in maintaining an independent internet sphere in China. Unlike the mass 
media, linguistic hidden transcripts allow actors the platforms to create their own content on 
the Internet. Mass media content is guided by government institutions, often meaning that 
content is pro-government oriented. Content on the Internet is created by the public. This 
means that the public has more control over the development of events by expanding 
knowledge with their opinions and perspectives. This type of communication, the manner in 
                                                 
288 ‘Grass-mud Horse - China Digital Space’ <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/space/Grass-mud_horse> [accessed 5 
April 2013]. 
289 “River Crab (河蟹)” in Chinese is homophone of “Harmony (和谐)” which is the Party’s propaganda 
catchword. Thus it is used to express the government’s censorship.  ‘Grass-mud Horse - China Digital Space’. 
290 James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (Yale University Press, 2008), 
p.53. 
291 ‘艾未未开始交代问题 涉偷漏税重婚证据确凿’ 
<http://cache.baiducontent.com/c?m=9f65cb4a8c8507ed4fece763105392230e54f7376395904468d4e41dce204c
413037bfa676750d55849e3a7a50f51541a0b560342a452ab49fc8834ecabbe57269d733712d5cd04e05a31bb8b83
732c050872b9eb869e1adf14284dfa5c4af5244cb23120bf6e7fc5a1764bc78806426e2d68e38154860ce&p=ce6fc7
16d9c240ff57ed957949488e32&newp=c462cd15d9c340a805b7c7710c179f335c5bc4387ebad51e7489c9&user=
baidu> [accessed 5 April 2013]. 
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which people engage and conduct communication, is conducive to the construction of 
individuals as conscious subjects.292  
The Internet sphere, with its elevated autonomy, contains the independence and objectivity to 
raise the quality of collective intelligence. More importantly, collective intelligence has a 
higher chance of surviving and growing when strategies to escape censorship are mobilized. 
The Internet’s high capacity to develop linguistic hidden transcripts is an excellent example of 
a strategy to promote the existence of collective intelligence in the face of severe censorship. 
In the case of Ai, the actors could obtain different perspectives on information regarding Ai 
by using the strategy of changing keywords to search, which could be considered that the 
linguistic hidden strategy made Weibo sphere to be closed to Twitter sphere. Resultantly, it 
has enabled a decentralized, yet effective, communication channel that challenges the 
hegemonic order in China.293 
This last example of qualitative growth is Microblog networking. Because Microblog 
networks are publicly visible by default, the network sharing mechanism on Microblogs 
promotes significant qualitative development.  
Ai’s Weibo account lists 107 people in whom Ai is interested and 4,049 people who are 
interested in Ai.294 Because Ai is an artist and political/social activist, Ai is mostly followed 
by other artists and political/social activists. 
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Fig 6.21) people who Ai is interested in, from his Weibo follower list 
Fig 6.21) shows three people who Ai is interested in. All three of these individuals are 
political dissenters who are interested in human rights and freedom of speech. On their Weibo 
platforms, human rights issues and social movements which were not covered by the mass 
media were actively updated. Ai’s Weibo account bridges his followers to more information 
and knowledge by sharing these other activist’s accounts. By viewing Ai’s network, 
individuals can find more information on diversified social movements, information regarding 
human rights, freedom of speech and political discussions. For example, I visited the account 
of one of the users that Ai is interested in, “左小祖咒 (Zuo Xiao Zu Zhou)” is a heavy metal 
rock singer in China, as well as a social activist.295 Through Zuo Xiao Zu Zhou’s network, I 
can enter further human right’s networks. From Zuo’s network list, I found one user called 
“人由自 1199 (Ren You Zi 1199)” who introduce himself as “No against the Party, No new 
China” on his Weibo account’s main page.”296 This user actively uploads content related to 
criticism of the Party system, freedom of speech, human rights, and the abuses of government 
authority (Fig. 27). He also posts about highly censored topics, such as Liu Xiao Bo (fig 6.22).   
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Fig 6.22) Ren You Zi 1199’s Weibo post regarding a police torture case and the wife of Liu Xiao Bo  
By network surfing on Weibo, individuals can connect to far more information than what Ai 
himself broadcasts. Weibo networks offer individuals the opportunity to develop collective 
intelligence by learning different information with related themes. Sometimes, Internet 
technology, especially social networking, is criticized because it can be utilized by the 
authority to capture anti-regime collectivity – such was the case in Iran.297 In a society where 
freedom of expression is not guaranteed, the Internet easily can be used as monitoring tool to 
spot anti-regime collectivity. However, the example of researching Ai’ Weibo network 
illustrates that the Internet can also offer a great opportunity to approach and develop 
knowledge about sensitive issues. From the perspective of accessing information, individuals 
could easily find several other people who are interested in a particular issue and actively 
publishing information. As a result, the individual has a higher opportunity to be stimulated 
by diversified information and further develop their own interests. The open network system 
in Microblogs offers individuals a greater chance to develop qualitative development by 
connecting with diversified information and deepening their understanding.  
6.4 Findings 
In this chapter, I tried to reveal the role and function of Microblogs in stimulating individual’s 
collective intelligence in China. I selected the case of Ai Weiwei because Ai and the authority 
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have a direct and visible confrontational relationship, and the pressure against Ai was 
relatively obvious. By researching an individual who is strongly censored in the Chinese 
Internet sphere, I attempted to find evidence of whether the Internet offers special advantages 
creating influential public power.   
My findings show that Microblogs are advantageous in raising information to the public 
agenda. Microblogs have a great capacity for broadcasting, enhanced by the ubiquity and 
speed of the Internet. They challenge the authority to a certain level, making it difficult to 
censor information that has already mobilized public opinion through quantitative 
development.  
Although the authority practiced a high level of censorship, the individual (Ai) and the public 
found several digital hidden transcripts to avoid censorship; by using homophones of 
censored words, the public continued communication on topics which were supposed to have 
been silenced. Technological software for bypassing censorship could be easily found using 
search engines. This gives the public the ability to create more independent Chinese Internet 
sphere. The Chinese authority’s continuous censorship can be interpreted as domination of 
information, a domination of the public. However, my results show that the Chinese public 
continuously cracks one of the highest censorship systems in the world and strives to 
democratize information with continuous strategies to bypass censorship. This indicates that 
the Chinese public is resisting domination.298 Through the democratization of information on 
the Internet and mocking the dominant elites, the public can maintain the public sphere 
(Internet) in an increasingly independent and neutral fashion – developing the influential 
power to democratize the public’s position in China.  
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7 Be a Newsmaker, Online Journalism 
In this chapter, I will attempt to discover how online journalism offers publics the opportunity 
to mobilize influential power in China. For my study, I selected the corruption case of the 
formal deputy mayor of Jining. I selected this case, because it was first published and 
broadcasted from the individual’s website. Using this case, I will examine the detailed process 
from initial publication to public reaction to find out how influential power was mobilized. 
In the first segment, I will briefly introduce the concept of online journalism. Next, I will 
analyze the cases development using process analysis. In the third segment, I will account as 
to how the Internet was utilized in this case to mobilize power. Finally, I will discuss online 
journalism’s role in China and its’ significance. 
7.1 Online Journalism 
7.1.1 What is Online Journalism?  
When the topic of online journalism is raised, it often comes up with several different names, 
such as public, civic, citizen, or participatory journalism. So, I will briefly explain the concept 
of public journalism before I discuss online journalism. Public journalism, in general, is a 
synonym for civic journalism.299 Public journalism started to become popular in the United 
States during the1990s. It was during this period that studies began focusing on the 
phenomena of public journalism from an academic approach. Edmund B. Lambeth stated five 
conditions of public journalism from the alternative media and democratic context; 1) Listen 
systematically to the stories and ideas of citizens even while protecting its freedom to choose 
what to cover. 2) Examine alternative ways to frame stories on important community issues. 3) 
Choose frames that stand the best chance to stimulate citizen deliberation and build public 
understanding of issues. 4) Take the initiative to report on major public problems in a way 
that advantages public knowledge of possible solutions and the values served by alternative 
courses of action. 5) Pay continuing and systematic attention to how well and how credibly it 
is communicating with the public.300 Michael Schudson defined public journalism in a similar 
                                                 
299 Theodore Lewis Glasser, The Idea of Public Journalism (Guilford Press, 1999); Edmund B. Lambeth, Philip E. 
Meyer and Esther Thorson, Assessing Public Journalism (University of Missouri Press, 1998). 
300 Lambeth, Meyer and Thorson. 
91 
 
context as “In which authority is vested not in the market, not in a party, and not in the 
journalist but in the public.’’301 Therefore, the word “public” in public journalism can be 
considered as referring to both participants (journalists) and themes (subject of the report). 
The Internet, especially Web 2.0’s popularization, significantly promoted public journalism. 
On the Internet, any individual can easily publish their own investigative report with blog or 
other communication platforms. As communication media is primarily produced by and for 
the public, weblogs foster public journalism, understood as an explicit alternative to 
mainstream journalism’s deference to dominant commercial and political interests and to 
public journalism’s mediation of the public interest by professional journalists.302 The concept 
of public journalism was continued online. And as public journalism was practiced in the 
Internet much often, so many people started to equalize online journalism and public 
journalism. But the meaning of public journalism refers more oppositional meaning of 
professional journalism, and online journalism mainly has oppositional meaning of 
mainstream journalists because online journalism limits the platform of the publication as 
Internet only, so platform of journalism is highlighted in the definition.  
Online journalism is often represented by blogs. However, after online journalism became 
popular, online news portal sites that were run by public began to gain in popularity. For 
example, one online news portal site from South Korea “OhMyNews (www.ohmynews.com)” 
is a participatory online news website that receives most of its news content from Internet 
users. CNN also followed the trend of online journalism by launching its “iReport” service on 
which the public can upload breaking news stories.  
Because of the functionality of the Internet, online journalism has similar key features like 
high-interactivity, hypertextuality, multimodality, and asynchronicity.303  There are few 
constraints for online news content, giving contributors the opportunity to call upon a range of 
sources.304 Online journalism, with its public oriented approach and the technological 
advantages of the Internet, promotes political participation and the engagement of the public. 
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As such, some studies state that online journalism promotes civic and transparent 
environments by developing “Little brother” syndrome.305  
On the contrary, few weblog writers engage in independent news reporting. For the most part, 
online journalism covers the same topics as mainstream news. Resultantly, the influence of 
mainstream news media on weblog coverage is further strengthened. Some studies state that 
through their own reporting or that of alternative news providers, weblog writes are 
strengthening the dominance of mainstream news media rather than challenging it.306 In 
addition, the professionalism and quality of online journalism is also questioned.  
7.1.2 Online Journalism in China  
Chinese mainstream journalism is under strict control, with rules that dictate what can and 
cannot be published. Online journalism promoted a Chinese journalism sphere with a less 
restrictive environment. In particular, online journalism has led to a rise in investigative 
journalism by the Chinese public via the Internet, permitting serious discussions and debates 
concerning citizens’ affairs in China.307 For example, mainstream journalists are not allowed 
to publish investigative pieces regarding corruption or sensitive issues. However, the Internet 
sphere doesn’t have regional limitations on what can be uploaded. The Internet has made it 
incredibly difficult for local officials to enforce media blackouts on sensitive issues.308 It is 
quite common for Chinese mainstream investigative journalists to research news and 
information on weblogs or online journalism sites.309 
The most popular online journalism case in China was perhaps the “nail house” case in 2007. 
Nail house refers to a household which has disobeyed the government’s order to relocate. In 
2007, a photo was uploaded with the title of “The Coolest Nail House in History (fig 7.1).”  
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 Fig. 7.1) the Coolest Nail House in History310 
The picture was quite extreme and it quickly became a popular issue on the Internet. The 
Mainstream media was very reserved in discussing the story. The first mainstream institution 
to report on the story, the Southern Metropolitan Daily, only published the nail house as an 
online discussion.311 The mainstream media’s passivity in reporting on the nail house 
stemmed from the story being about a conflict between the authority and the individual. Then, 
a Chinese blogger with the user name “Zola Zhou” traveled to Chongqing where “the Coolest 
Nail House” was located. He investigated the circumstance surrounding the nail house case by 
interviewing the house holders. His investigation was published to the public via his blog, 
which many users visited and commented on.312 Mainstream Chinese media couldn’t dare to 
do something similar. This illustrates the Internet sphere as a less self-censored sphere for 
publication. During the investigation of nail house, Zhou had no guarantee on the quality of 
his method of investigation. So during the process of investigation and writing, he sought out 
help from professional journalists.313 It cannot be denied that the quality of online 
investigation journalism could be quite challenged by the lack of professionalism.  
It seems that the Internet could be a great platform to promote journalism in China. However, 
although individuals are free to upload anything into the Internet sphere, the Chinese 
government also has been tightly controlling online journalism since 2001. With the 
authority’s prompt filtering and censorship, many online journals are constrained in the same 
ways as the mainstream media.  
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Many studies have researched the impact of online journalism, with social and political 
contexts, in China.314 But still, there is not much research about the detailed process analysis 
of case development. In other words, most of these studies only use journalism theory and 
political theories to explain the significance of online journalism in China. This case analysis 
is my contribution to filling in the gap. I selected a qualitative process analysis of the 
corruption case of the former mayor of Jining province to achieve this. By in-depth analysis 
of the event process, I will observe the public’s power mobilization development and strategy 
using the theory of collective intelligence.  
7.2 Case Process Analysis 
In this segment, I will first explain the circumstances of the event. Secondly, I will analyze 
how quantitative development and qualitative growth were promoted via online journalism.   
7.2.1 Corrupted Mayor 
Li Xin was Deputy Major of Jining City in Shandong Province from 1994 to 2004. He was 
also in charge of Jining City High-Tech Development Zone Management Committee at the 
same time. Because he was specialized in managing high-tech industry development, Li Xin 
had many relationships with large, private high-tech enterprises. In the beginning of 2002, Li 
Xin met Li Yuchun, a business woman in Shanghai, and made her a victim of his corruption.  
The deputy mayor proposed to Li Yuchun that they do business together. His plan was to set 
up the company in Shanghai, with Li Yuchun hired to run the company’s administration. 
Because the deputy major was a government employee of the Communist Party, he couldn’t 
register a private company under his name. Instead, he registered the company under his son’s 
name and a fake identity. This fake identity was issued by the official Jining City Police 
Office. The laundered identity was legalized by the Jining City Police Office because of the 
deputy mayor’s political position. 
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After the company was set up, the victim realized that the company had been established for 
the purpose of money laundering for bribes. For example, in December 2002, Li Xin came to 
the Shanghai office with a check for $486,000 USD (3million RMB), public funds designated 
for the Jining City machinery Design Institute (济宁市机械设计院), and asked Li Yuchun to 
cash the check into the company account. Li Yuchun worked at the office for less than a year. 
By the beginning of 2003, she had decided to quit the company.  
Then, on February 23rd, 2003, the deputy mayor, his brother – the Jining city police office 
deputy director, and hired gang members kidnapped Lu Yuchun. She was beaten, tortured, 
and threatened by them to not to spread a word about Li Xin’s corrupted dealings. 
The seventh day of the kidnapping, Li Yuchun was forced to go to the company’s bank in 
Shanghai, because her ID was needed to withdraw the cash. At the bank, the staff that noticed 
something was strange and called the police. And at the bank, Li Yuchun was finally saved by 
the police. 
After Li Yuchun was released, she went into hiding in Beijing. From there, she decided to call 
the police and report everything. She also tried to get the story of the deputy mayor’s 
corruption published. The deputy mayor visited Li Yuchun hometown and tried to find her. 
Also through private process, Li Xin used his high-political position to meet with the deputy 
mayor and the police office director of her hometown (De Zhou:德州) and place Li Yuchun’s 
name onto the wanted circular. When the deputy mayor discovered that Li Yuchun was suing 
him, he asked her to meet with him in person. She agreed. When they met, the deputy mayor 
kneeled down to ask her not to sue him and begged that no stories about his corruption be 
published. The negotiation didn’t work out. On May 29th, 2003, Li Yuchun was attacked by 
seven men in the middle of a street in Shanghai. They quickly ran away. The attackers were 
deputy mayor’s gang, the same men that had kidnaped Li Yuchun. On October18th, 2003, Li 
Xin hired professional killer and 20 additional men to kill Li Yuchun. The deputy mayor’s 
corruptive behavior continued, even after Li Yuchun had sued him. For instance, he 
transferred public funds of over $1.6million USD (10million RMB) to his son’s account and 
bought his son a BMW worth over 100 thousand USD. Li Yuchun tried to publish this event 
for a year, but no one was willing to investigate the case or publish a piece about it.315 
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Furthermore, she called the police to ask them to investigate the case as well as suing him, but 
the deputy mayor remained in office whereas Li Yuchun had to go into hiding for fear of 
another physical attack.  
On June 10th, 2004, the event hit a major turning point because of online journalist, Li Xinde. 
Li Xinde is former professional journalist who runs a blog called “Public Opinion 
Surveillance Net.” He was the first journalist to take up the case,316 and the deputy mayor’s 
corruption was finally exposed to public through Li Xinde’s website. Because his report was 
properly investigated and written with convincing evidence, especially several pictures of the 
mayor that show him kneeling and crying, as he tries to convince Li Yuchun to drop the 
charges against him (fig.7.2), it received huge attention from the public in a very short time.  
 
Fig. 7.2) Jining deputy mayor, Li Xin kneeling317 
The shocking story and pictures spread quickly under that tag “Kneeled deputy mayor (下跪
的副市长).” Li Xinde’s investigative report reached approximately 1.7million clicks.318 On 
July 22nd, 2004, the story of the corrupted deputy mayor was covered by almost every 
mainstream media group; from Southern Weekly, which produces one of the top investigative 
journalism,319 to the Party’s highest media groups, such as CCTV and People’s Daily.320 
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In July 27th, 2004, the deputy mayor was arrested on suspicion of stealing public funds, 
laundering money, etc. After the investigation, it was discovered that Li Xin had received 
over $731,000 USD (4.5 million RMB) in bribes between 1991 and 2004. As a result, In July 
of 2005, he was convicted of bribery and sentenced to life in prison, confiscation of all private 
property, and deprivation of political rights.321  
7.2.2 Online Journalism and Public Power Mobilization 
This case could be considered as news that survived from both self and external censorship. 
The reason why this story could be exposed to the public, survive censorship, and obtain 
public power can be explained by several ways.  
First, the lower censorship and speed of the Internet created the right conditions for the report 
to quickly and expansively obtain the public’s attention. When the deputy mayor’s illegal acts 
were first revealed, the story quickly reached 1.7million views. The online report was copied 
and forwarded to other blogs and BBS, which further raised its exposure. The report 
explosively collected the public’s attention and significantly raised quantitative development 
as a result. This, as a result, shifted the case from being between Li Yuchun vs. the deputy 
mayor to the public collectively standing up against the deputy mayor. It is the same 
mechanism that turned a single individual’s idea on the Carbonrally site in becoming a proper 
challenge with other users’ support. With the public’s attention and support, the report and Li 
Yuchun obtained the resistant and influential power to not to be filtered and censored. Unlike 
mainstream media, which is a physical institute, the virtual Internet sphere makes it harder for 
individuals to exert political influence. In sum, the Internet provides a platform to expose the 
news with a great deal less pressure and self-censorship on the newsmaker (news uploader). 
After the news is published online, the Internet’s speed and less limited access gives the 
newly published information a greater opportunity to survive censorship. As a result, online 
news reports can continue to broadly mobilize quantitative development of collective 
intelligence.     
The second pattern of quantitative development is the collaboration between online 
journalism and mainstream media. This.is observed after an event gains public attention and 
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power is mobilized, as discussed above. This interaction creates a sort of “knock-on effect of 
power” and pushes quantitative development from the virtual public’s attention on to the 
offline public agenda. Mainstream journalists, especially investigative journalists, are aware 
of the role of watch dog functions; one of these conditions is that it is much easier to criticize 
an official who has already been accused of corruption by the central government than one 
who is secure in his position. This is often phrased as “it is easier to hit a dead tiger than a live 
one.”322 Two weeks after Li Xinde uploaded his story on the corrupt deputy mayor, the 
government took action. On June 23rd, the deputy mayor was called before the Chinese 
Communist Party discipline inspection organs and “Shuang Gui (双规)” was implemented. 
Shuang Gui is a special rule of the Chinese Central Communist Party that applies to its Party 
members. If the high Party member is accused of wrongdoings, the Party discipline inspection 
organs order the suspected bureaucrat to explain himself at a designated location and time.323 
It is called “Double Designation” in English. The deputy mayor received a Shuang Gui order, 
but was not arrested. In addition, because the case was being handled by the central Party 
organ, most of the investigation information was not open to the public. However, because the 
government admitted to investigating Li Xin and was taking certain actions, the mainstream 
media became braver. On July 22nd, the investigation newspaper Southern Weekly published 
the first mainstream media report about the deputy mayor and the allegations being made 
against him. In other words, after the virtual public’s attention gained influential power, the 
government took action - although it looked a little bit as if the government was attempting to 
keep the issue in the dark. The government’s reaction turned the deputy mayor into a “dead 
tiger” which made mainstream media comfortable enough to publish the corruption case. It 
was a domino effect.  
The mainstream media’s influence on the quantitative development of the case was enormous. 
The first mainstream publication of the event highly relied on Li Xinde’s online investigative 
report . Many of the pictures and overall content were copied from Li Xinde’s original report. 
After the Southern Weekly published the news, it was covered by central and local 
government newspapers and portal news sites.324 The joining of online and mainstream 
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journalism greatly raised the exposure of the news and had a great synergy effect on 
quantitative development. Five days after the mainstream media’s first publication, the deputy 
mayor was arrested. From the first publication to the deputy mayor’s arrest, the power of 
public’s attention is clearly illustrated. The deputy mayor did not receive any sanctions during 
the year that Li Yuchun spent suing him. After the event was published to the public  online, 
it only took 13 days to get a reaction from the government (Double Designation). And finally, 
when the mainstream media published the story on/offline, it only took five days for Li Xin to 
be arrested. 
When the Internet’s political influence is discussed, doubts often arise about the quality of 
information and interaction. Online journalism is often criticized for its lack of 
professionalism and quality.325 It is criticized that political online debates promote political 
dialogue but without crystalizing any form of action or change.326 It is said that the Internet 
cannot raise concerns about the fundamental preconditions and essential alternatives or 
transformations of a regime. However, what was observed in the case of the deputy mayor’s 
corruption was a little bit different. Since China has a strong pattern of a centralized regime, 
the media institute shows high dependence on the authority. In such circumstance, 
information reported by the mainstream media is put through a great level of self-censorship. 
As discussed above, online journalism first cracked the information which resultantly made it 
possible to arrest the deputy mayor. Indeed, it is important to measure the quality of the 
activity on the Internet in order to evaluate its influence. In some circumstances, information 
in the mainstream media faces a great level of self or external censorship, decreasing the 
exposure rate of the information to the public. The value of the Internet should be evaluated 
on the possibility of less restricted publication of information into the public sphere. In the 
case of Li Xin, the Internet raised the influential power of the information just by exposing it 
to the public. Ultimately, the mainstream media, under a strong censorship mechanism, 
obtained the conviction and confidence to publish to the public. After that, the lack of 
professionalism in the news content could be supplemented by online and mainstream 
journalism’s collaboration. Collaboration between online journalism and mainstream media 
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also had a great synergetic effect on the quantitative development of the case. The influential 
power of quantitative development was clearly proved by the government’s subsequent 
reaction towards the deputy mayor.   
Qualitative growth was also raised at several stages of the case and raised the influential 
power of the public. 
The collaboration and interaction between Li Yuchun and Li Xinde, the online journalist, 
shows a clear pattern of collective intelligence by qualitative growth. Li Yuchun, as an 
individual suffering because of a corrupt, high-level bureaucrat, tried herself many times to 
punish the deputy mayor through the legal system and through having her story published by 
the mainstream media. The problem with the case of a corrupt high-level bureaucrat is that 
there is usually a network of corruption. In the case of the deputy mayor, the corruption was 
not simply receiving bribes, but involved many other officials. For example, the Jining City 
Police Office which issued the fake ID to the deputy mayor was involved. The Jining City 
Police Office’s deputy director, the deputy mayor’s brother, participated in kidnapping Li 
Yuchun. This is a general pattern in political corruption, organizing and developing with a 
network mechanism. Many corruption investigation cases begin with minor politicians, only 
to later find out the major politicians were involved. The rule among mainstream journalists is 
that “It is easier to swat a fly than to hit a tiger.”327  
If Li Yuchun had written and published her news story online, there’s a high probability that 
it would have either been ignored or censored. The collaboration with Li Xinde who was 
former professional journalist and has his own website raised the quality of the information. 
Resultantly, the news content obtained convincible power and a sphere to slip away from 
censorship. It is same mechanism as the Carbonrally site’s qualitative growth from 
collaboration between the scientific advisers and the idea providers. 
Because Li Xinde was a former professional journalist, his online report was executed with 
high-professionalism, based on his own investigation and evidence. He confirmed every 
details of the story and investigated the occupation and status of all of the individuals in the 
report. When he wrote about the story of Li Yuchun kidnapping, Li Xinde visited police 
offices in Shanghai to confirm that the case had happened. He clearly stated in his report 
where and who had confirmed the event in the police station as “Check Shanghai Ruijin 
                                                 
327 He. 
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Police station and the record from 6th unit of criminal investigation (见上海瑞金警署 和刑侦
六队的记录).”328 Another example, when Li Xinde reported on Li Yuchun being suddenly 
attacked on a street in Shanghai, he wrote the car number of the attackers and the owner as 
“One of the cars was a black color, the Car number is LU H09999. After the investigation, it 
is confirmed as Wang Bin329 (其中一辆是黑色的, 车牌号为鲁 H0999,后经核实此车为王宾
所有的.)”330  
The last part of the reports from Li Xinde also indicates his professionalism, which saved the 
report from certain levels of censorship. The rule of mainstream journalists when they have to 
reveal corruption cases is that they must mention and underline the Party and the 
government’s resolves to combat corruption.331 Li Xinde clearly acknowledged the rule in 
revealing such a sensitive story. In the last part of his report, he wrote “However, we strongly 
believe that the justice of law will win this time and Li Xin (the deputy mayor) will not be 
able to slip away from the judgment of the law and the public.”332 Resultantly, the report 
could develop qualitative growth because it was written by a former professional journalist, 
and the information could obtain a much stronger impact and persuasive power to the public, 
instead of being censored or ignored.    
Li Xinde’s online report triggered the broadcasting and the publication of the deputy mayor’s 
corruption both on and offline. With the story being openly reported, the Internet sphere could 
obtain a greater level of transparency and openness. With such an environment, the public 
could discuss and build public opinions in a liberal and autonomic environment. This 
ultimately created a co-existence of rich contents and diversified opinions on the event.  
For instance, one user posted article to criticize the media institute as “Found out the stupidity 
and servility of Shandong media from observing Jining deputy mayor’s case……This case 
                                                 
328 ‘下跪的副市长 —山东省济宁市副市长李信丑行录 - 中国舆论监督网--中国最著名、最有影响力的反腐
维权网站’. 
329 Wang Bin was introduced at the participant of the kidnapping the victim. According to Li Xinde, he is Jining 
Zhongyi group’s chairman (济宁中亿集团). 
330 ‘下跪的副市长 —山东省济宁市副市长李信丑行录 - 中国舆论监督网--中国最著名、最有影响力的反腐
维权网站’. 
331 He. 
332 Translated by the aurhot from Chinese to English, original sentence as “但我们坚信,法网恢恢正义必胜,李
信终究逃脱不了法律和人民的制裁.”‘下跪的副市长 —山东省济宁市副市长李信丑行录 - 中国舆论监督网
--中国最著名、最有影响力的反腐维权网站’. 
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has been discussed by the public for so long….Where has Shandong media been? Don’t you 
know the responsibility of the media and listening to public opinion?”333Discussions in BBS 
sites have generated several different opinions and perspectives. For instance, some users 
argued “It is not a problem of journalists, they are just puppets at most (这不是记者的事,记
者顶多是个大茶壶或龟公而已).”334 Or some commented as “Is it happening just in 
Shandong? It seems that all media institutes are like that (光山东是这样的吗？好象全国各
地的媒体都如此).” In addition, different perspectives were also observed in comments that 
criticized Party bureaucrats, like, “I just think that the quality of the bureaucrats is getting 
worse and worse by the generation (只是觉得官员的素质一代不入一代了).” “This Party’s 
number is up already!! (这个党已经气数已尽!!)” Other members of public were pay 
attention to the victim’s status, such as “How is Li Yuchun?”  
With different opinions and perspectives’ co-existence, the online public sphere became less 
biased and obtained a certain level of independence. It offered the public a place to develop 
collective intelligence by being stimulated with diversified information. As a result, this 
created an advantageous platform to develop qualitative growth. 
7.3 Findings 
In this chapter, I examined online journalism and its social influence in China. Online 
journalism, as a continuous version of public journalism, shows less self-censorship than 
mainstream journalism. Instead of having a strong engagement with existing power, social 
orders, and elite hegemony which mainstream media does,335 online journalism appears to 
have a strong public engagement. Such a pattern appeared in China, where the government 
and the mainstream media have strong engagement. Because of a centralized hegemony 
system, mainstream journalists have no choice but to help maintain the values of whoever is 
                                                 
333 Translated to English by the author, original in Chinese is “从济宁副市长李信下跪一案看山东媒体的奴性
与弱智……这个案子闯入大家视野已经这么久, 山东媒体你们到哪里去了? 你们难道不知道公众的心声和
媒体的责任?”‘从济宁副市长李信下跪案看山东媒体的奴性与弱智_山东_天涯论坛’ 
<http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-42-550062-1.shtml> [accessed 28 April 2013]. 
334 ‘从济宁副市长李信下跪案看山东媒体的奴性与弱智_山东_天涯论坛’. 
335 Douglas M. McLeod and James K. Hertog, ‘The Manufacture of `Public Opinion’ by Reporters: Informal 
Cues for Public Perceptions of Protest Groups’, Discourse & Society, 3 (1992), 259–275. 
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in power.336 The victim of the deputy mayor’s corruption failed to publish her story through 
mainstream media, as well illustrated above. 
Online journalism, though often criticized for its’ lack of professionalism and quality, but it 
plays a crucial role in countries with strong limits on the publication of information-such as 
China. Online journalism offers the public the ability to become “newsmakers” via an 
alternative broadcasting channel, the Internet. The possibility of publishing the news to the 
public via online journalism encourages the public sphere in China to be an increasingly 
democratic independent environment. Online journalism allows events, news, and information 
to have an opportunity to stimulate the public and raise the influential power via collective 
intelligence. So to speak, individuals, by obtaining the ability to publish the news, raise the 
opportunity to mobilize influential power using the technological advantages of the Internet. 
Resultantly, the public can take a watchdog role against corrupt bureaucrats. 
 
                                                 
336 Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media 
(Pantheon Books, 1988); Paul S. Voakes, ‘A Brief History of Public Journalism’, National Civic Review, 93 
(2004), 25–35. 
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8 Conclusion 
In this thesis, I attempted to discover the role of the Internet in state, society relations in China 
by analyzing the fundamental functions of the Internet. In order to observe the shift in the 
relationship between public and state power, I analyzed three online social mobilizations 
against political elites. The roles of the Internet were discussed by observing how the 
politically suppressed individuals mobilized and practiced their influential power against the 
dominant authority. 
In order to evaluate the degree of influential power in the online movement, collective 
intelligence theory was presented - collective intelligence being the method of developing the 
influential power of information. In addition, based on two different methods to enhance and 
coordinate the information, I conceptualized quantitative development and qualitative growth 
in the collective intelligence. By developing the value of the information, collective 
intelligence raises its impact and influence.  
The result of the case analysis indicates that the Internet sphere is advantageous in mobilizing 
social movements in China for several reasons. First, from the context of the opportunity to 
mobilize social movements, the Internet sphere allows a much higher capacity to mobilize 
than traditional mainstream media. For example, Li Yuchun was unable to publish her story 
and organize public opinion with mainstream media or other public platforms. However, the 
Internet platform offered her and online journalists the opportunity to expose the story and put 
down the former deputy mayor of Jining city. The information gained a higher chance of 
increasing its’ power via collective intelligence. This was possible because the Internet has 
much less self –censorship than the mainstream media. The anonymity and equality of 
individuals in the Internet sphere also makes it possible for anyone to update and publish 
information which couldn’t be exposed in mainstream media. 
Secondly, from the context of advertising social mobilization, the Internet platform shows 
strong advantages in China. In here, the advertisement of social mobilization could be 
referred to as quantitative development in collective intelligence. The degree of attention and 
the number of the participants in the process of social mobilization is very important in 
practicing influential power. The de-territorialized Internet sphere, with its rapid sharing 
speed, offered Ai Weiwei the ability to successfully start his money raising campaign and 
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continue to resist the political elites. Short and advanced, the “@” technology in 
Microblogging maximizes the broadcasting function of the Internet platform. This enables the 
information to appear to the public agenda much quicker and in a broader fashion. By that, it 
challenges the authority to censor the information. 
Thirdly, the Internet sphere is an advantageous platform in developing the quality of 
information.  From the social movement perspective, it gives the movement a greater 
persuasive power. This could be referred to as qualitative growth in the collective intelligence. 
For instance, in the case of the human flesh search on politician Zhou Jiugeng, individuals 
started to suspect Zhou’s corruption. The doubts and opinions of individuals didn’t have any 
power to bring Zhou down from his position. However, individuals investigated evidence of 
his corruption on and offline and published it to the public. This collaboration, as a result, 
offered the movement a much stronger persuasive power. The investigation was possible 
because the Internet has massive amounts of information accessible via search engine. The 
public could follow their curiosity and investigate the issue, something not possible with 
mainstream media.  
In the phenomena of technical hidden transcripts to bypass censorship, massive amounts of 
content can be utilized through search engines - offering the public to take initiative in 
information management. For example, individuals in different professional fields can update 
their knowledge online and others can discover what they want to know through search 
engines. For instance, the Chinese authority blocked the access of Twitter in order to maintain 
an easy construction of national commonality in the Internet sphere. However, the Internet 
search engine offers the opportunity to easily find technical hidden transcripts and bypass the 
authority’s censorship and filtering of contents and access. With such an opportunity, 
individuals online obtain a higher opportunity to acknowledge cultural and political 
differences by communicative de-territorialization.337   
From the information perspective; by removing limits to the opportunity for information to be 
exposed to the public, the Internet democratized the publication of information. From the 
individual’ perspective; by removing limits to the opportunity to access information, the 
Internet more liberalize the process of interaction. As a result, information’s greater 
                                                 
337 Andreas Hepp, ‘New Media Connectivity: a New World of Mobility? The Internet, Identity and 
Deterritorialization in Europe’, Brooksbank Jones, Anny/Cross, Máire: Internet Identities in Europe. Sheffield: 
University of Sheffield. http://www. shef. ac. uk/content/1/c6/04/88/28/Hepp.pdf [31.12. 2005], 2005. 
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opportunity to be exposed to the public, and the public’s greater opportunity to participate and 
interact together raised the opportunity to develop collective intelligence and obtain the power 
of information. 
The state, media institutions, and the public are closely connected and influence each other. 
Media is a bridge between the state and the public, so by observing the media institutions, we 
can understand the relationship of the state and the public. In China, the open policy in the 
1980s’ put the position of the media closer to the public, rather than representing the state 
power. However, after the Tiananmen pre-democracy movement, the role of the media shifted 
to being the mouthpiece of the state power. The Internet’s popularization and the flourishing 
of online information raised the Internet’s position as a media form. The results of my case 
analysis illustrates that the Internet is more that an independent sphere to obtain and share 
information. It is a public oriented platform. Like in the case of online journalism, the 
corrupted political bureaucrat couldn’t influence or exercise his political power against the 
Internet as he did on the mainstream media, so the publication of his corruption first appeared 
on the Internet. The detention of Ai Weiwei was also first published online. Further, the 
mainstream media only covered the positive side of Zhou Jiugeng’s new policy, whereas the 
Internet sphere was filled with complaints from the public. Therefore, although a strong and 
systemized online censorship is practiced by the authority in China, it should be highlighted 
that the Internet itself is still maintained as a public oriented and independent sphere – 
separate from the state power. 
Because the Internet sphere is relatively independent from the state power, it is possible for 
diversified ideas and opinions to coexist. The first diversification is observed is opinions. The 
public had different opinions on Zhou Jiugeng’s new real estate policy and stated a human 
flesh search. Some agreed on his new policy based on the market economy, and some 
disagreed. All these different opinions stimulated the public in an objective manner. This 
neutral space promoted individuals to have independent minds and points of view.  
Even though the quality of political discussion on the Internet is criticized,338 my results 
illustrate that the Internet sphere is more liberalistic than the mainstream media. What should 
be highlighted in here is that the Internet promotes the public’s political participation and 
                                                 
338 T. Ogura, ‘Electronic Government and Surveillance-oriented Society’, Theorizing surveillance: The 
panopticon and beyond, 2006, 270–295; Tanni Haas, ‘The Public Sphere as a Sphere of Publics: Rethinking 
Habermas’s Theory of the Public Sphere’, Journal of Communication, 54 (2004), 178–184. 
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engagement. In China, the public easily obtained the opportunity to be political engaged 
through the Internet. And as the Internet sphere is a more public-oriented sphere than 
mainstream media, it significantly decentralizes communication. As the communication 
pattern between the authority and the public is shifted, it was observed that institutional 
loyalties declined in the Internet sphere. It was very easy to observe in the Chinese Internet 
sphere that the public directly criticizes, curses, and creates satire out of the Party and the 
authority system. From this sense, we could assume that the Chinese public has a higher 
capacity to be “Dissatisfied Democrats”339 in the Internet sphere. This is a method of political 
engagement, expressing doubts and distrust of the government. Individuals can raise their 
critical opinion of political elites and generally be more negative toward political parties.340 
This sort of pluralistic environment significantly raises the public’s position in a centralized 
power state.  
My results indicate that even though the authority controls and highly censors the Chinese 
Internet sphere, the Internet shows a high capacity to raise the individuals’ position to a 
negotiable level against the dominant hierarchy. This is achieved by democratizing 
information and liberalizing the opportunity to participate in the collective intelligence.  
 
 
                                                 
339 Russell J. Dalton, Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties In Advanced Industrial Democracies, 
5th Edition, 0 edn (CQ Press, 2008). 
340 Dalton. 
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